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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

EDGAR TIEDEMANN,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 20050676-SC

:

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(h) (2002)
(providing appellate jurisdiction over interlocutory appeals in criminal cases). Appellant
Edgar Tiedemann requested permission to appeal from an interlocutory order. On
October 24, 2005, this Court granted the request in an order attached as Addendum A.
STATEMEN1 OF I HE ISSUES AND S 1AINDAKPS OF REVIEW
A. Whether the trial court erred in failing to suppress statements obtained in violation of the state and federal constitutions and Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
Standard of Review: A bifurcated standard applies to the first issue. This Court
will review a trial court's tactual findings for clear error, State v. Trover, 910 P.2d 1182,
1186 (Utah 1995), and its legal rulings for correctness. See State v. Rettenbergen 1999
UT 80,^10, 984 P.2d 1009.
B. Whether the state's destruction of potentially exculpatory evidence in this case
constitutes a violation of Tiedemann's due process rights.
Standard of Review: The second issue is a question of law, which this Court will

review for correctness. | e e e.g. State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994), abrogated
on other grounds as stated in Campbell v. State Farm, 2001 UT 89, f 13, 65 P.3d 1134.
PRESERVATION OF ARGUMENT
The first issue on appeal was preserved in the record at 246-267; 337-358; and
638:5-9, 13-19. The second issue was preserved at 388-404; and 638:19-28, 32-34.
RULES, STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The following provisions are relevant and set forth at Addendum B: U.S. Const,
amends. V, VI, and XIV,, § 1; Utah Const, art. I, § 7.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case, Course of the Proceedings, Disposition in the Court Below
In November 200^, the state charged Tiedemann with three counts of murder
under Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (Supp. 1991), stemming from events that occurred in
November 1991. (R. 1-5). The defense requested discovery (see R. 24-27), and on
October 6, 2003, the tria.ll court bound Tiedemann over for trial on the charges. (R. 99).
On December 6, 21004, Tiedemann filed a motion to suppress statements made
during a police interrogatjion in November 1991. (R. 246-267; see also 337-358). The
trial court took the matter under advisement and set the case for an 8-day trial to begin in
January 2006. (R. 513-14; 581-83). On December 20, 2004, Tiedemann filed a motion to
dismiss based on the state's destruction of exculpatory evidence in the case in 1993. (R.
388-404). The trial court took that matter under advisement as well. (R. 513-14).
On July 22, 2005, Ithe trial court issued a memorandum decision and order denying
the defendant's request td suppress the interrogation statements (R. 585-595), and on
2

September 27, 2005, the trial court issued a second decision denying the defendant's
request to dismiss the case due to the destruction of exculpatory evidence. (R. 599-607).
A copy of the trial court's July 22 order is attached as Addendum C, and a copy of the
September 27 order is attached as Addendum D.
Tiedemann filed a timely petition and amended petition from the issuance of each
interlocutory order (see e.g. R. 598, 608-610; Addendum A, hereto). On October 24,
2005, this Court granted the petitions for this appeal. (See Addendum A). The trial is
stayed pending resolution of the issues here. Tiedemann is incarcerated.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The state charged Tiedemann with three counts of murder for the deaths of Susan
Sessions, Charles Timberman, and Scott Bunnell, Jr. (R. 1-5). It alleged that on
November 1, or November 2, 1991, Tiedemann shot the victims at his trailer home at
3874 Hummingbird, West Valley City. (Id.) Susan Sessions and Charles Timerberman
died at the scene; Scott Bunnell died in February 2001. (IdL; R. 438).
On November 2, 1991, police took Tiedemann into custody and recovered
evidence from the trailer home, including blood and tissue samples, fingerprints, drugs,
paraphernalia, and items of clothing and bedding. (See R. 389; 477-78). They also
recovered weapons, and interrogated Tiedemann for a confession. (See R. 3-4).
The state originally charged Tiedemann on November 5, 1991, with two counts of
aggravated murder, one count of attempted aggravated murder, one count of aggravated
kidnapping, and one count of aggravated sexual assault (Case No. 911013168). (R. 52629; 477; 519). The original trial court ordered competency evaluations. (R. 519).
3

After evaluations, the court found Tiedemann to be incompetent. (R. 519-20; 532).
His mental illnesses included mild dementia, which was partially "substance-induced,
and partially due to cerebrovascular trauma in 1988; organic mood disorder [] (depression
with mood congruent psychotic features); and inhalant dependence." (R. 532).
Tiedemann also suffered from a neurological disorder due to a brain injury he
suffered in 1988; he had "difficulty understanding and expressing ideas conveyed through
verbal language;" and he suffered from a Mixed "Personality Disorder with Paranoid,
Schizoid and Antisocial features." (R. 532). "The combination of organic brain damage,
intractable craving for Toluene, and personality disorder [made] it highly unlikely that
Mr. Tiedemann [would] ever be able to function in a rational legal manner outside a
supervised residential Hying facility." (R. 532-33). Due to the mental illnesses, "the
defendant has lost the capacity to comprehend his position, to understand the nature and
object of the proceedings against him, to conduct his defense in a rational manner, and to
cooperate with his counsel to the end that any available defense may be interposed."
(R. 534). Tiedemann also exhibited difficulty concentrating on tasks and understanding
verbal instructions, and he had difficulty with word retrieval and concentration. (R. 540).
Tiedemann's long+term clinical prognosis in 1992 was abysmal. (R. 536). His
condition would "remain! incompetent in the foreseeable future in the absence of more
vigorous psychopharmacologic treatment of his depression and psychosis." (R. 532).
Due to the psychological evaluations in 1992, the state determined to dismiss the
original charges against Tiedemann. It also represented that it would not file charges in
the future. (R. 477-78; see 558). "As a result, the West Valley City Police Department
4

ultimately destroyed the evidence that was collected at the crime scene." (R. 478 (state's
pleadings)). A list of destroyed evidence is attached as Addendum E.
In October 2002, an attorney in Utah County advised the Salt Lake District
Attorney's office that Tiedemann would be released from the state hospital. (R. 562).
Apparently the hospital was unable to secure federal aid for Tiedemann's treatment and
further placement due to his foreign citizenship. (See R. 562; 636:19).
In November 2002, the state filed the underlying charges here against Tiedemann.
(R. 1-5; 478; see also 636:19). The state has not disputed in filings with the trial court
that Tiedemann suffered diminished mental capacity at the time of the police interrogation in November 1991. (See e.g. R. 470). Likewise, the state has not disputed the "defendant's claim of intoxication" at the time of the interview in November 1991. (R. 471). It
also has not disputed the destruction of potentially exculpatory evidence. (R. 477-78).
Additional facts relating to the issues on appeal are set forth below. Tiedemann is
incarcerated. A trial is stayed pending resolution of the issues in this interlocutory appeal.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Officers obtained confessions from Tiedemann during an interrogation. The
confessions were unlawful in two respects. First, Tiedemann was intoxicated and
mentally impaired; he disclosed to officers that he did not know if he was capable of
understanding and answering questions. Also, Tiedemann was deemed to be mentally
incompetent shortly after the interrogation. Officers disregarded the circumstances, and
engaged in tactics designed to keep Tiedemann talking in order to obtain a confession.
The waiver and confessions here were not voluntary and must be suppressed. Second,
5

Tiedemann invoked the right to remain silent during questioning. Officers failed to honor
his request. That violates Miranda. The confessions must be suppressed on that basis.
Next, if the government destroys potentially exculpatory evidence in a criminal
prosecution, a federal due process analysis requires the defendant, who is seeking relief,
to prove that the government acted in bad faith. In this case, state agents knowingly and
willfully destroyed all physical evidence related to the shootings; their conduct supports
bad faith. In addition, the evidence was potentially exculpatory. The destruction of
evidence constitutes a violation of Tiedemann's due process rights under a federal
analysis. Tiedemann is entitled to relief: the charges must be dismissed.
In the alternative, this Court may look to article I, section 7 of the state constitution and adopt a different analysis when police destroy evidence related to a criminal prosecution. Specifically, this Court may determine that the defendant is not required to
prove bad faith. Instead,, this Court may adopt an analysis that considers several factors
for a remedy, including the state's culpability in destroying the evidence, the significance
of the evidence, and the prejudice to defendant. Other jurisdictions have adopted such an
assessment. On that basils, this Court may remand for further proceedings.
ARGUMENT
POINT I. OFFICERS OBTAINED INCRIMINATING STATEMENTS IN
VIOLATION OF STATE AND FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL
PROVISIONS AND IN VIOLATION OF MIRANDA.
A. TIEDEMANN DID NOT WAIVE HIS MIRANDA RIGHTS; AND HE
SPECIFICALLY INVOKED HIS RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT.
The federal constitution provides that no person "shall be compelled in any cri-

6

minal case to be a witness against himself." U.S. Const, amend. V; see also Utah Const,
art. I, § 12. Under the law, a person in custody must be advised, prior to questioning that
"he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court
of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an
attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires." Miranda
v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479 (1966); id. at 444. Also, before a statement may be taken,
an officer must obtain a clear and unequivocal waiver of these rights from the accused.
See State v. Leyva, 951 P.2d 738, 743 (Utah 1997).
Unless an accused is informed of his rights and he "knowingly and intelligently
waive[s] these rights and agree[s] to answer questions or make a statement," Miranda,
384 U.S. at 479, the government may not present the statement in evidence at trial. Id.
An accused's ability to knowingly and intelligently waive his rights per Miranda is
assessed under the totality of the circumstances. See State v. Norfolk, 381 N.W.2d 120,
127 (Neb. 1986). An intelligent, voluntary waiver occurs when the defendant possesses
the capacity to understand the warnings and to act in response to them. See id. at 125.
Also, voluntariness is met if the officer obtains a waiver without coercion.
Coercion invalidates the voluntariness of the waiver and/or the confession. Coercion in
the confession may be established with evidence of the details of the interrogation and/or
the suspect's condition or circumstances. See e.g. Rettenberger, 1999 UT 80 at ^14-15.
If an officer knows that a defendant is mentally disabled, and nevertheless exploits his
condition for a waiver or confession, those facts may support coercion. See id. at ^45.
This Court has ruled that the government has "a heavy burden" to establish that a
7

defendant waived his Miranda rights before questioning. See Leyva, 951 P.2d at 743.
Also, the government must establish the voluntariness of a confession. Rettenberger,
1999UT80atU45.
Once the government has established an initial waiver, the suspect then bears the
burden to establish that a subsequent invocation of rights was clear and unequivocal. See
Leyva, 951 P.2d at 743; State v. Galli, 967 P.2d 930, 935 n.4 (Utah 1998); Davis v. U.S.,
512 U.S. 452, 459 (1994). n[T]he suspect 'must articulate his desire to have counsel
present sufficiently clearly that a reasonable police officer in the circumstances would
understand the statement to be a request for an attorney.'" Leyva, 951 P.2d at 743 (citing
Davis, 512 U.S. 459).
If a suspect later invokes his rights, officers are required to "scrupulously honor[]"
the request. Michigan v, Mosely, 423 U.S. 96, 104 (1975).
If the individual ihdicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during
questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease. At this
point he has shown that he intends to exercise his Fifth Amendment privilege; any
statement taken after the person invokes this privilege cannot be other than the
product of compulsion, subtle or otherwise.
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 473-74 (note omitted).
In this case, the officers violated Tiedemann's right not to incriminate himself in at
least two respects. First,, Tiedemann was incapable of making a knowing and voluntary
waiver of his rights per Miranda. When the interrogation began, Tiedemann disclosed
that he was intoxicated ahd he did not know if he was capable of answering questions.
Officers were aware of the circumstances and disregarded them in pursuit of obtaining a
confession. That rendersithe interrogation illegal. (See infra, Point I.B.(l), herein).
8

Second, Tiedemann invoked the right to remain silent during questioning and the officers
failed to stop the interrogation. Those circumstances render the confessions unlawful.
(See infra, Point LB.(2), herein). Each matter is addressed in turn below.
B. THE TOTAL CIRCUMSTANCES HERE SUPPORT AN ILLEGAL
INTERROGATION.
In this case, officers interrogated Tiedemann at the police station on the day of the
shootings. The interrogation was videotaped and transcribed in part. The transcript is
attached as Addendum F; the video is included in the record. (R. 611).
The interrogation started at 1:58 p.m. with Detective Ron Edwards and Sergeant
Ed Spann. Edwards explained that Tiedemann signed a paper, which gave officers
permission to search his home (see R. 611, video at 1:58 and transcript at 3 (stating
Tiedemann signed a waiver for his home)). Also, Edwards explained that Tiedemann
waived his rights per Miranda and was not intoxicated. (See R. 611, video at 1:58 to
2:01). Tiedemann corrected Edwards, stating he was intoxicated on Toluene. (Id.)
Edwards asked how long Tiedemann had been on Toluene, and he responded, "since
1962." (Id.) His substance abuse was long-term.
Edwards asked whether Tiedemann was incapable of answering questions. He responded, "Sometimes. I don't know." (Id.) This part of the interrogation is not included
in the transcript. (Compare R. 611, video; with transcript); Addendum F, hereto.
After Tiedemann notified the officers of his impaired state, and after they
observed his condition, the video stopped and started again 12 minutes later at 2:13 (see
R. 611, video). The interrogation began a second time at 2:15. (Id.)
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With the second interrogation, Edwards recited Miranda warnings. (See R. 611,
video and transcript at page 1). He made no mention of the consent form that Tiedemann
apparently signed for his home. (Id.) Also, he and Spann asked if Tiedemann understood
his rights and if he "still wish[ed] to speak to [them] at this time." (See R. 611, video
and transcript at 1). Tiedemann answered, "Ya," to both questions. (See R. 611, video
and transcript at 1). Hisicondition on the video tape appeared subnormal: he was sagging
with his head down, andp generally out of it. (R. 611, video).
Edwards then asl^ed Tiedemann, "Are you intoxicated" (id.), even though he could
observe Tiedemann's condition and had already established that fact in the first part of the
interrogation. (See R. 611, video from 1:58 to 2:01). Tiedemann again responded in the
affirmative. He stated he was on Toluene. (See R. 611, video and transcript at 1). This
time Edwards did not stop the interrogation. Instead, he brushed the information aside
and moved on to discuss] the shootings at Tiedemann's address, as follows:
RE [Ron Edwards]: Are you intoxicated?
ET [Edgar Tiedemann]: On toluene.
RE: What's toluene?
ET: Toluene. It's, it's a paint thinner.
RE: It's a paint thinner?
ET: Ya.
RE: Okay, do you know why we're going to talk to you?
ET: Ya.
RE: What are we (going to talk to you about?
ET: The murders out there.
RE: What murders?
ET: The murders out there at West Valley.
RE: Who are they?
ET: Suzie, Chuck and Scotty.
RE: Whose [sic] Suzie?
ET: She's the woman I love.

10

(R. 611, video). At this point, Tiedemann began to cry.
RE: That you love?
ET:Ya.
RE: What happened to her?
[Silence].
(See R. 611, video). Tiedemann then informed officers, "I don't want to talk about it."
(See R. 611, video and transcript at 2). The officers did not discontinue the interrogation.
They continued questioning:
ET: / don't want to talk about it.
RE: You don't want to talk about it?
ET:No.
ES: Edgar?
ET: What.
ES [Ed Spann]: What don't you want to talk about?
ET: 1 love that woman so much.
ES: What is it that you don't want to talk about?
[Silence].
ES: You said murders in West Valley, where in West Valley?
ET: . . . inaudible . . . Hummingbird Street.
ES: I'm sorry, where?
ET: 1308 [sic] Hummingbird Street.
ES: 1308 Hummingbird, who lives there?
ET: Me.
RE: Who lives with you?
ET: Suzie and Scotty and they just moved in today or last night, I don't know.
RE: Okay, what don't you want to talk about?
[Silence]
RE: Edgar?
[Silence]
RE: What don't you want to talk about, Ed?
(See R. 611, video). Tiedemann did not respond. He cried as Spann stated the following:
ES: Edgar, we 're not going to force you [to] talk about anything. We 're asking
you questions. As Detective Edwards stated, you can answer this question, not
answer that question, answer this question, not answer that question. You don't
have to answer any of our questions at all. You can stop at anytime.
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(R. 611, video and transcript at 2 (emphasis added)). Tiedemann said, "Okay." (R. 611,
video). The officers continued:
ES: He made that clear to you, right?
ET: Ya.
ES: Okay. You stated you wanted to talk to us, what part do you and what part
don't you want to talk to us about?
[Silence]
RE: Edgar do you remember me reading your rights earlier and you signing a
waiver lor us to starch your home?
ET: Ya.
RE: Okay, we were called to your home on a gunshot. We got in there and seen
some people. Who shot them?
(See R. 611, video). Tiedemann confessed to the shootings. As officers continued to
interrogate him, he began to repeatedly state, "I don't know." (See R. 611, video and
transcript at 4). Edwards then questioned Tiedemann further about his intoxication.
RE: How long have you been sniffing that solvent?
ET: Since 1962.
RE: Tonight how Hong? Or today?
ET: All day.
RE: Do you know what today's date is?
ET: You told me but I don't remember.
RE: Do you know what day of the week it is?
ET: No.
RE: What was yesterday?
ET: 1 don't have &ny idea.
(See R. 61 K video and transcript at 4).
Officers then asked Tiedemann about employment; they continued to question him
about the shootings and obtained additional confessions from him; and they asked
questions about Tiedemann's history. (R. 611, video and transcript at 4-33). As they
asked again about Scott Punnell, Susan Sessions, Charles Timberman, and events leading
up to and shortly after thp shootings, they increased the pace of the interrogation. (See R.
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611, video and transcript at 5).
Officers also asked if Tiedemann had "mental problems." He told them he had
"all kinds." He told them he thinks he is "Adolf Hitler." (See R. 611, video and transcript
at 9). Edwards asked if Tiedemann heard voices, and he asked, "Who was telling you to
go shoot them?" Tiedemann answered, "The devil." (See R. 611, video and transcript at
13-14). Tiedemann appeared intoxicated, exhausted, disoriented or confused, and out of it
with head lowered, sometimes crying.
Near the conclusion of the interrogation, officers asked Tiedemann to affirm that
he made incriminating statements of his own tree will. The recording reflects the
following: Tiedemann stated that Susan Sessions and her sister Deborah used heroin the
night of the shooting. Spann asked where:
ES: They were doing heroin before they got to your house?
ET:Yeah.
RE: Who with?
ET: 1 don't know.
RE: With him?
ET: 1 don't know.
RE: Is Debbie a prostitute, too?
ET: I think so.
ES: So you asked Suzie to sleep with you and she called you disgusting?
ET: Ya, 1 guess so.
ES: Well no, it is true or not?
ET: 1 thinks it is.
ES: Okay, I'm just telling you what you told me.
ET:Ya.
RE: Edgar?
ET:Huh?
RE: Why did you shoot them?
ET: I don't know.
RE: Why did you shoot Scotty and Chuck then?
ET: I don't know. I just, I don't know.
RE: Have we made any threats to you during this interview?
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ET.No.
RE: Have we promised you anything?
ET:No.
RE: Are you making this statement on your own free will?
ET: Ya.
(See R. 611, video and transcript at 33-34). Tiedemann stated he wanted to be "put to
death by lethal injection!1' he acknowledged he would be charged with capital homicide
and he reiterated to officers that he was under the influence of Toluene. (See R. 611,
video and transcript at 35). Edwards then asked, "How do you feel?" Tiedemann
answered, "Lousy." He also stated that he "sometimes" understood what the officers
said. (See R. 611, video and transcript at 35). The interrogation concluded at 3:00 p.m.
In trial court proceedings, the defense asked the court to suppress the confessions
where the waiver and confessions were involuntary. (R. 339-58). Also, the defense
argued that when Tiedemann invoked his right to silence shortly after the interrogation
began, the officers failed to scrupulously honor the request. (Id.) In a memorandum
decision dated July 22, 2005, the trial court denied the motion to suppress. (R. 585-595).
With respect to the voluntariness of Tiedemann's waiver and confessions, the court
stated that the officers did not use false statements or half-truths; they did not use the
false-friend technique; they did not use threats or promises; the interrogation took place
in an hour; and the officers did not deny "special requests of the defendant. There is no
evidence of any ethical iliisconduct by the police." (R. 591). The court considered there
to be no coercion. (R. 591-92).
Also, the court referenced Tiedemann's diminished mental capacity, that he was
under the influence of Toluene, and he suffered other mental impairments. (See R. 592).
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However, the court was not compelled by those facts and determined that the factors
relevant to lack of voluntariness were not present in the instant case. (R. 593). It stated,
"Prior to his interrogation, defendant had not been found incompetent or 'insane,' and
similar coercive factors were absent." (R. 593-94).
With respect to whether Tiedemann invoked his Miranda rights during the interrogation, the court determined that after Tiedemann advised officers that he "did not want
to talk about it," officers asked further questions that Tiedemann answered. (See R. 590).
Based on that, the court should have ruled that officers failed to honor Tiedemann's request. Instead, it ruled that Tiedemann did not invoke his rights during questioning. (Id.)
The trial court's rulings are in error. Tiedemann requests that this Court reverse
the rulings since the confessions were illegally obtained. (See infra, Point I.B.(l) & (2)).
The trial court here did not observe witnesses as they testified, and it was not required to make credibility determinations concerning witnesses and their testimony. (See
R. 638). The trial court reviewed the interrogation and had filings from 1991 and 1992.
Those filings are available to this Court for review. (See R. 611; 530-53 (expert reports)).
(1) The Waiver and Confessions Lacked Voluntariness.
Under the law, the state must establish the voluntariness of a waiver and confession under the totality of the circumstances. See Rettenberger, 1999 UT 80 at ^14-15,
45; State v. Strain, 779 P.2d 221, 225-26 (Utah 1989). The state must prove that the
suspect's waiver was clear, unequivocal, knowing and intelligent. See Leyva, 951 P.2d
at 743. Also, the confession must be voluntary. Rettenberger, 1999 UT 80 at ^[45.
Utah courts look to both the tactics of the officers and the characteristics of the
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accused in considering voluntariness. See Strain, 779 P.2d at 225-26. For example, if
officers use abusive physical tactics, that supports coercion. See Beecher v. Alabama,
389 U.S. 35 (1967) (offilbers held a gun to the suspect's head). Likewise, if officers
exploit a suspect's vulnerabilities or are insensitive to special circumstances, that supports
coercion. See e.g. Rettenberger, 1999 UT 80 at ^26 (recognizing that techniques that
bear no resemblance to Abusive coercion may nevertheless be coercive, depending on the
suspect's circumstances)!.
The voluntariness assessment considers the suspect's perceptions and
understanding, and it includes objective factors such as the age, maturity, intelligence,
schooling, mental condition, and intoxication of the suspect. See e.g. Colorado v.
Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 163-65 (1986); State v. Williams, 295 S.E.2d 493, 498 (N.C.
App. 1982); Henry v. D^es, 658 F.2d 406, 409 & 411 (5th Cir. 1981).
Courts have found involuntary waivers and confessions where officers exploited
or disregarded a suspect's deficiencies, vulnerabilities, or impairments to pursue a
confession. See Rettenberger, 1999 UT 80 at ^[45 (stating that defendant's confession was
involuntary to the extent his will, "already vulnerable due to certain known mental
disabilities and deficiencies, was overborne by the suggestive and coercive techniques" of
interrogators); Russell vff State, 460 N.E.2d 1252 (Ind. App. 1984) (defendant was a
patient in a mental institution); Henry, 658 F.2d at 408 & 411; State v. Graham, 642
S.W.2d 880 (Ark. 1982)1; see also State v. Clark, 460 A.2d 449 (Vt. 1983) (recognizing
that the government muit establish a proper waiver where defendant's mental capacity
may be affected by intoxication); People v. Washington, 486 N.Y.S.2d 660, 662-63 (N.Y.
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Sup. 1985) ("The court finds that defendant's intoxication seriously impaired his ability to
understand the nature of his waiver and the results that would flow from it").
In Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, the United States Supreme Court
considered an officer's obligations during interrogation when faced with a mentallydisturbed suspect. In that case, the defendant approached an officer and told him that he
wanted to confess to a murder. Id. at 160. The officer was bewildered. He provided
Miranda warnings, and the defendant insisted that he understood his rights and wanted to
talk. Id. at 160. Connelly confessed to the murder of a woman. Id.
The officer later learned that the defendant was psychotic. Id. at 161. However,
he was unaware at the time of the confession of defendant's mental impairment. Id.
Under the circumstances, the U.S. Supreme Court refused to find that the officer
engaged in coercive conduct. The Court ruled that "[a]bsent police conduct causally
related to the confession, there is simply no basis for concluding that any state actor has
deprived a criminal defendant of due process of law." kf at 164 (footnote omitted).
The Court nevertheless recognized that a confession may be coerced where an
officer knows of a suspect's deficiencies at the time of questioning and exploits the
circumstances. See id. at 164-65 (citing Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 207-08
(1960); Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 298-99 (1963)).
In another case, Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, the defendant was charged
in 1948 with robbery. At the time of the offense, he already had suffered "a lengthy siege
of mental illness." kf at 200.
He had served in the armed forces during World War II, but had been discharged
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in 1944 as permanently disabled by a psychosis. He was thereupon placed in an
institution and given medical treatment over extended periods until February 14,
1948, when he wjks released from a Veterans Administration hospital for a ten-day
leave in the care of his sister. He failed to return to the hospital and consequently
was discharged on May 24, 1948. The robbery of which he stands convicted
occurred during this period of unauthorized absence from a mental ward.
Blackburn's medical records further disclose that from 1946 he was classified by
the Veterans Administration as 100 percent "incompetent" and that at the time of
his discharge from the hospital both his diagnosis of "schizophrenic reaction,
paranoid type" and his characterization as "incompetent" remained unchanged.
Id. at 200-01. Shortly after the offense, Blackburn confessed. Id, During the interrogation, he answered questions "like any normal person." Id, at 204. "The Chief Deputy
conceded that Blackburn said he had been a patient in a mental institution, but claimed
that Blackburn also statdd he had been released, and avowed that Blackburn 'talked sensible and give (sic) sensible answers,' was clear-eyed, and did not appear nervous." Id.
After the arrest, the judge had the defendant examined by three physicians, and
concluded that he was insane "either at the time of the commission of (the) offense or at
the present time." Id. at 201. The judge committed Blackburn to the state hospital where
he remained for more than four years for treatment. Id, at 201-02. When Blackburn was
deemed competent, his case went to trial. Id, There he maintained his insanity; he
claimed he could not remember the crime, his arrest, his confession, his commitment to
the hospital or his treatment; and he denied the truth of his confession. Id, at 202.
When the prosecutor sought to admit the confession into evidence, the defense
objected and referenced the physicians' reports and records from the competency
hearings. IcL The prosecutor countered the reports with evidence of an additional
physician. Dr. Richards,, who was a staff member at the state hospital. Id. at 203. The
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doctor's answers were in harmony with other reports regarding the finding that Blackburn
had been insane. Id. However, during "cross-interrogatories,"
[the doctor] executed an astonishing about-face by opining that Blackburn had
been "normal" since he first saw him, that his mental condition was "normal" on
the date of the crime and "good" on the date of the confession, and that he had
never seen Blackburn suffer "psychotic episodes." Even this portion of the
deposition is not without incongruity, however, for Dr. Richards' response to one
cross-interrogatory was that he did not believe Blackburn had experienced lucid
intervals.
Id. at 203-04. The parties also presented evidence concerning the circumstances of the
interrogation, where it lasted 8 or 9 hours with a one-hour break for dinner. Id.
The trial court admitted the confession into evidence. Id at 205. The jury convicted the defendant of the offense and the state appellate court affirmed. On review to
the U.S. Supreme Court, it reversed the conviction. Id. The Court looked to the circumstances of the interrogation, id at 207-08 (acknowledging the length of the interrogation
in a tiny room filled with officers and without friends, relatives, or legal counsel for the
defendant), and it considered the defendant's mental condition. It determined that the
circumstances supported "the strongest probability that Blackburn was insane and
incompetent at the time he allegedly confessed." Id at 207. It stated the following:
[C Joercion can be mental as well as physical[. T]he blood of the accused is not
the only hallmark of an unconstitutional inquisition. A number of cases have
demonstrated, if demonstration were needed, that the efficiency of the rack and the
thumbscrew can be matched, given the proper subject, by more sophisticated
modes of "persuasion." A prolonged interrogation of an accused who is ignorant
of his rights and who has been cut off from the moral support of friends and relatives is not infrequently an effective technique of terror. Thus the range of inquiry
in this type of case must be broad, and this Court has insisted that the judgment in
each instance be based upon consideration of "the totality of the circumstances."
Id. at 206 (note and cite omitted).
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It also recognized the following:
It is, of course, quite true that we are dealing here with probabilities. It is possible,
for example, that Blackburn confessed during a period of complete mental
competence. Moreover, these probabilities are gauged in this instance primarily
by the opinion evidence of medical experts. But this case is novel only in the
sense that the evidence of insanity here is compelling, for this Court has in the past
reversed convictions where psychiatric evidence revealed that the person who had
confessed was 'OF low mentality, if not mentally ill,1 Fikes v. State of Alabama,
supra, at page 196, 77 S.Ct. at page 284, 1 L.Ed.2d 246, or had a 'history of
emotional instability,' Spano v. People of State of New York, supra, 360 U.S. at
page 322, 79 S.Ct. at page 1206, 3 L.Ed.2d 1265. And although facts such as
youth and lack ol education are more easily ascertained than the imbalance of a
human mind, we cannot say that this has any appreciable bearing upon the
difficulty of the ultimate judgment as to the effect these various circumstances
have upon independence of will, a judgment which must by its nature always be
one of probabilities.
Id. at 208 (note omitted), The confession was deemed to be involuntary and
inadmissible. Id. at 210.
The lessons of th# above cases apply here.
In this case, officers were advised of and observed Tiedemann's intoxicated and
mental condition at the beginning of and during the interrogation. (See R. 611, video).
Notwithstanding, they proceeded with questioning for a confession, disrespecting his
requests to not talk about the shootings; moving forward with the interrogation while
Tiedemann cried; persisting with repeated questions at times; accelerating the pace or
trading off with questions. (Id.) Their tactics were intended to keep Tiedemann talking
in order to obtain a confession. The totality of the circumstances here fails to support
voluntariness. Thus, the interrogation was unlawful.
Turning first to the trial court ruling, the court stated the following:
Here, the interrogators did not make use of false statements or half-truths. They
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did not use the false friend technique by implying they were acting in the best
interest of the defendant by the simple use of his first name. The detectives did
not use any threats or promises to entice the defendant into a confession. The
entire interrogation took place within one hour, and during the investigation, the
interrogators did not deny any special requests of the defendant. There is no
evidence of any ethical misconduct by the police. In short, the record shows that
the detectives' interrogation was absent any suggestive and coercive techniques.
(R. 591-92). With respect to Tiedemann's condition, the trial court stated,
The defendant's prolonged use of Toluene, the stroke he suffered in 1982, or a
head injury received as a child might be the cause of his generalized cerebral
damage resulting in severe impairment of intellectual functions and an 82 I.Q.
(Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion to Suppress, p. 14.) The
defendant's reference that he believes he is Adolph Hitler indicates that he knows
Hitler is dead and he does not have an actual belief that he is Hitler. His reference
to Satan telling him to commit the criminal act may also stem from his religious
beliefs. "A perception of coercion flowing from the 'voice of God' is a matter to
which the Federal Constitution does not speak."
(R. 592-93). The court also stated that prior to the interrogation Tiedemann had not been
found to be incompetent "and similar coercive factors were absent." (R. 593-94).
The trial court's discussion of the interrogation in this case failed to consider
several relevant circumstances. See Rettenberger, 1999 U T 80 at Tfl9 (stating that the
trial court failed to consider the "totality of the circumstances" in its analysis).
Specifically, the interrogation took place at police headquarters in an interrogation
room. Tiedemann did not have the support of relatives or legal counsel, although he was
being interrogated for aggravated and capital offenses. (See R. 611, video and transcript).
The trial court's analysis made no mention of those circumstances. (R. 591-94).
In the initial moments of the interrogation, the officers represented in the tape
recording that they gave Miranda warnings to Tiedemann, he waived the warnings, and
he was not intoxicated. Tiedemann corrected the officers. (R. 611, video at 1:58 to
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2:01). He advised that he was intoxicated on Toluene and had abused the substance since
1962. When officers asked if Tiedemann were incapable of answering questions,
Tiedemann responded affirmatively. He stated, "Sometimes. I don't know." (R. 611,
video at 1:58 to 2:01).
That exchange cannot be construed to support that Tiedemann provided a knowing
and voluntary waiver, lhdeed, the officers recognized problems with continuing and they
stopped the interrogation. (R. 611, video at 2:01). When the officers began the recording
again 12 minutes later, eiven though they had been advised that Tiedemann was intoxicated and incapable of understanding and answering questions, they made no attempt to
resolve the matter. But $ee Leyva, 951 P.2d at 743-44 (recognizing that the state must
establish that the suspect understood, and clearly and unequivocally waived his rights per
Miranda; M[i]f the suspect responds ambiguously or equivocally," the officer must focus
on clarifying the suspect's intent and understanding). Instead, they avoided the subject
entirely to proceed with an interrogation. (See R. 611, video and transcript). The trial
court's analysis failed toltake those circumstances into consideration in assessing the
voluntariness of the waiter and confessions. (See R. 591-94).
In the second attempt at the interrogation, officers provided the warnings, asked if
Tiedemann "wish[ed] to speak" to them, and asked if Tiedemann were intoxicated. (R.
611, video and transcript at 1). Tiedemann again disclosed his intoxicated condition.
(Id.) Officers would have observed that Tiedemann's demeanor was subnormal. He was
slumped down with his head lowered; at times during the interrogation he cried, and/or
he appeared confused and exhausted and was unable to answer questions (R. 611, video).
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Officers brushed aside Tiedemann's obvious impairments and inebriated condition to
proceed with questioning for a confession. (Id.)
Also, officers persisted with questions even after Tiedemann invoked his right to
remain silent shortly into the interrogation (infra Point I.B.(2); R. 611, video and
transcript at 2-3). Indeed, in an effort to get Tiedemann talking, they represented that he
could answer some questions and not others. (R. 611, video and transcript at 3). That
was misleading. It docs not adequately reflect Miranda. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479
(stating a suspect has the right to remain silent); Mosely, 423 U.S. at 101, 103-04 (stating
an invocation of the right to remain silent must be honored); (infra, Point LB.(2)). The
tactic was intended to overcome Tiedemann's will so that he would continue talking. See
Reltenberger, 1999 UT 80 at ^|20 (recognizing that police misrepresentations designed to
overcome a defendant's will render a confession involuntary). That was improper.
The officers persisted with questioning for an hour, at times trading off or
increasing the pace to keep it moving. (R. 611, video and see e.g. transcript at 3, 5-6, 78). They were steadfast and determined. Their tactics were designed to exploit
Tiedemann's impaired condition, to keep him talking even after he had expressed that he
did not want to talk about the shootings (see id.; infra, Point LB.(2)), and to take
advantage of the circumstances to extract a confession. That constitutes misconduct. See
Rettenberger, 1999 UT 80 at ^}45 (ruling that the officers' various tactics were used to
exploit defendant's deficiencies, rendering the defendant's statements involuntary). The
trial court did not adequately consider the circumstances in its analysis. (R. 591-94).
The trial court's analysis failed to consider what the officers observed and knew
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about Tiedemann's condition when they engaged in an interrogation for a confession.
(See R. 591 -94). It failed to properly consider that Tiedemann had disclosed to officers
his inability to understand and answer questions, his intoxicated state, and his mental
condition. (See R. 591-94; R. 611, video). It also failed to take into consideration that
officers would have observed Tiedemann's deficiencies, and they nevertheless exploited
them for the waiver and confessions. (See R. 591-94; R. 611, video).
Next, the circumstances support "the strongest probability that [defendant was]
incompetent at the time he allegedly confessed." Blackburn, 361 U.S. at 207. Shortly
after the interrogation, Tiedemann was declared incompetent. (See R. 532, 534).
Physicians described Tiedemann as "alert, but distractible. He alternated between
attention to task to a somewhat vacant stare. His verbal response time was delayed and it
was clear that his comprehension for complex questions or directions was impaired." (R.
534). "He demonstrate^] significant impairment in judgment, attention and concentration, and a mild deficit of immediate memory." (Id.) Also, there was "significant
impairment of his ability to understand and follow simple commands." (Id.) He
exhibited difficulty concentrating on tasks and understanding verbal instructions.
"[Instructions had to be repeated and explained several times " (R. 540).
He was "only partially able to cooperate" with experts (R. 535). Also, his Toluene
addiction resulted in "repetitive episodes of acute delirium." (R. 534).
While experts were not required to assess Tiedemann's mental state on the day of
the interrogation, their findings after working with him from November 1991 to January
1992, were undisputed qnd the prognosis was hopeless and grim. (R. 537, 545, 552-53).
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There is nothing in this record to suggest that an assessment of Tiedemann's
mental condition and intoxication for the date of interrogation would have been more
optimistic and uplifting. (See R. 531-53). Indeed, since the experts' reports came after
Tiedemann spent months living in a controlled environment with treatment and without
access to Toluene, it is improbable to believe anything but that Tiedemann's condition at
the time of interrogation was incompetent and mentally ill. See Blackburn, 361 U.S. at
201, 207 (considering experts' reports to support the strongest possibility that defendant
was incompetent at the time of the confession).
Tiedemann ultimately was committed to the Utah State Hospital in 1992, where he
was medicated and treated for 10 years. Experts opined that given the nature of the brain
damage in early 1992, he may not be rehabilitated. (R. 536-37, 545).
In this case, the trial court disregarded those circumstances in its analysis. Yet they
are relevant. See Blackburn, 361 U.S. at 202, 207-08 (considering reports from trial
competency proceedings); Washington, 486 N.Y.S.2d 660 (considering intoxication).
The trial court here recognized that Tiedemann suffered "generalized cerebral
damage resulting in severe impairment of intellectual functions and an 82 I.Q." that may
be due to drug use, and/or a stroke or head injury (R. 592); it recognized instability
during the interrogation where Tiedemann at times provided detailed answers, but at
other times did not provide clear answers (R. 586, 593); and it considered Tiedemann's
references to Hitler and the devil.1 (R. 592-94). Those facts together with the total

The trial court was not persuaded by Tiedemann's reference to Hitler. However, it
believed that Tiedemann's reference to Satan may be real and may stem from religious
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circumstances surrounding Tiedemann's condition "indisputably establish^] the strongest
probability" that defendant was incompetent "at the time he allegedly confessed."
Blackburn, 361 U.S. at 207.
Here, Tiedemann advised officers of his condition; they were aware that he was
incapable of understanding and responding to their questions, and the officers observed
Tiedemann's demeanor during the interrogation. (R. 611, video and transcript). To the
extent the officers may have considered it possible that—notwithstanding the signs of
impairment—Tiedemanp was competent when they proceeded with the interrogation (but
see R. 61 1, video), they cannot be excused for ignoring his disclosures and their
observations when incompetence, in fact, ultimately was established. (See e.g. R. 532).
Surely in the present stage of our civilization a most basic sense of justice is
affronted by the spectacle of incarcerating a human being upon the basis of a
statement he made while insane; and this judgment can without difficulty be
articulated in terms of the unreliability of the confession, the lack of rational
choice of the accused, or simply a strong conviction that our system of law
enforcement should not operate so as to take advantage of a person in this fashion.
Blackburn, 361 U.S. at 307.
"[A]s interrogators have turned to more subtle forms of psychological persuasion,
courts have found the mental condition of the defendant a more significant factor in the
'voluntariness' calculus.'1 Rettenberger, 1999 UT 80 at ^[15 (citing Connelly, 479 U.S. at
164). Thus, under the totality of circumstances analysis, the trial court was required to
consider the factors relevant to the defendant's mental condition. Also, it was required to
beliefs. (R. 592). It then discounted that reference on the basis that the federal
constitution does not protect against coercion flowing "from the 'voice of God.'" (Id.)
Significantly, Tiedemann did not claim in this case that such a voice coerced him into
confessing; his claims of coercion related specifically to the officers' conduct.
26

consider that officers were informed and aware of the defendant's vulnerabilities, and
they exploited them with subtle techniques. See e.g. id. at ^15-16.
The trial court here "erred in failing to conduct a 'totality of circumstances'
examination of [defendant's] confession to determine whether the interrogators exploited
[his] disabilities and deficiencies in such a way that his 'will was overborne.'"
Rettenberger, 1999 UT 80 at ^[19 (cite omitted).
Officers were informed from the beginning that Tiedemann would not be able to
understand and answer questions, and they were advised of his long-term substance abuse
and intoxication. (R. 611, video at 1:58 to 2:01). They made no effort to resolve those
matters or his inability to understand and answer questions for a clear, unequivocal,
voluntary waiver and confession. Instead they proceeded with questioning. (R. 611,
video). That constitutes coercion. See e.g. Rettenberger, 1999 UT 80 at TJ25 (stating that
evidence must reveal some physical or psychological force or manipulation designed to
induce the accused to talk when he otherwise would not have done so) (cite omitted). The
trial court's ruling should be reversed.
(2) Tiedemann Unequivocally Invoked the Right to Remain Silent During the
Interrogation.
If a suspect initially waives his rights per Miranda, he may indicate "in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, [and] the
interrogation must cease." Miranda, 384 U.S. at 473-74; see also Edwards v. Arizona,
451 U.S. 477, 479 (1981) (statement that defendant "want[ed] an attorney before making
a deal" was sufficient to warrant termination of interrogation); Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S.
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91, 93, 96-97 (1984) (defendant's statement, "Uh, yeah, I'd like to do that," in response to
the officer's advice that defendant could have cittorney present constituted invocation of
Miranda rights requiring cessation of questioning); State v. Wood, 868 P.2d 70, 83 (Utah
1993) ("Edwards dealt with a clear, unequivocal request for counsel"), disavowed on
other grounds, State v. Mirquet, 914 P.2d 1144, 1147 n.2 (Utah 1996).
In Edwards, 451 U.S. 477, the defendant was interrogated on two occasions. Both
times he waived his Miranda rights. Id. at 479. At the conclusion of the first interrogation, defendant stated he wanted to "make a deal" with officers. Id. When he was told
officers had no authority to negotiate, he initiated a call, hung up after a moment, then
stated "I want an attorney before making a deal." Id, Questioning ceased until the next
day when officers interrogated him a second time. Id The Arizona court ruled that
defendant waived his rights per Miranda. Id. at 479-80. The Supreme Court reversed.
The reference to an attorney in Edwards for the purpose of "making a deal" was
sufficiently unequivocal to warrant suppression of the statements. Id
In Michigan v. Mosely, 423 U.S. 96 (1975), officers arrested the defendant
Mosely in connection with a series of robberies and took him to headquarters for questioning. The defendant signed a Miranda form. Id. at 97. Detective Cowley began
questioning, then defendant invoked his right to remain silent. IcL He stated that he did
not want to answer questions about the robberies. Id. at 97. Cowley ceased the
interrogation and took Mosely to a holding cell. Id.
Cowley then arranged for a second officer, Sergeant Hill, to interrogate Mosely
two hours later about an unrelated homicide. Id at 98. Cowley did not tell Hill about
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Mosely's invocation of the right to remain silent. Hill began the interrogation by advising
Mosely of his rights. "Mosley read the notification form both silently and aloud, and
Detective Hill then read and explained the warnings to him and had him sign the form."
Id. at 98. Mosely then implicated himself in the homicide. Id. He ultimately was
convicted of murder and appealed, challenging the confession. Id. at 99.
In reviewing the matter, the United States Supreme Court recognized that if a suspect indicates during questioning that he wishes to remain silent, his request must be
scrupulously honored, and the interrogation must stop. "At this point he has shown that
he intends to exercise his Fifth Amendment privilege; any statement taken after the
person invokes his privilege cannot be other than the product of compulsion, subtle or
otherwise." Id at 100 (citing Miranda, 384 U.S. at 473-74).
However, the questioning may continue, as it did in Mosely's case, after a reasonable hiatus and readmonition of Miranda rights. The Court found that the second interrogation there was lawful where there was a sufficient break in circumstances to separate
the first interrogation from the second. Mosely, 423 U.S. at 104-05. Specifically, Cowley
immediately stopped the first interrogation when defendant invoked the right to remain
silent; he did not attempt to persuade Mosely to reconsider his decision; the second or
subsequent interrogation occurred after a "significant period of time" had elapsed (i.e.,
two hours); the subsequent interrogation was conducted by a different officer, Hill, who
was not involved in the first interrogation; the subsequent interrogation concerned
different charges; and Hill began the later interrogation with a clear and express recitation
of the rights per Miranda and a waiver by the defendant. Id.
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Applying the relevant principles here, Tiedemann unequivocally invoked the right
to remain silent. (R. 611, video and transcript at 2).
During questioning Tiedemann clearly stated to officers, "I don't want to talk
about it." (R. 61 1, video and transcript at 2). That constituted an unequivocal invocation
of his rights per Miranda. See e.g. Mosdy, 423 U.S. at 97 (when defendant stated that he
did not want to talk about the robberies, the officer ceased the interrogation); Emspak v.
U.S., 349 U.S. 190, 194 (1955) (stating that a suspect is not required to use a ritualistic
formula or talismanic phrase to invoke his rights); see also State v. Crump, 834 S.W.2d
265, 266, 269 (Tenn. 1992) (defendant told police he had nothing to say; police failed to
scrupulously honor invocation), cert, denied, 506 U.S. 905 (1992); Christopher v. Fla.,
824 F.2d 836, 840-41 (11th Cir. 1987) (defendant's statement, "I got nothing else to say,"
constituted invocation), cert, denied, 484 U.S. 1077 (1988).
Notwithstanding the invocation, the officers here did not scrupulously honor the
request. They continued questioning. (R. 611, video and transcript at 2-3). The trial
court characterized the continued questioning as follows:
When Det. Edwards asked, "What happened to her (Suzie)?" the defendant said, "I
don't want to talk about it." Immediately afterward, when asked, "What don't you
want to talk about?" he remained silent. Immediately thereafter, when asked,
"Who is Suzie?" he responded without delay, "The woman that I love." The
defendant readily answered other questions throughout the interrogation, except
when asked, "What happened to Suzie?"
(R. 586 (emphasis added); see also 590). The trial court considered the continued
questioning to be appropriate. (R. 586; 590). It refused to suppress the confessions that
followed. That was error. The trial court misconstrued the interrogation, and it
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misapplied the law in this case.
To start with the interrogation, the video shows that Edwards asked if Tiedemann
knew why he and Spann were talking to him. Tiedemann answered affirmatively.
Edwards then asked M[w]hat are we going to talk to you about?" Tiedemann answered,
"[t]he murders out there" in West Valley. Edwards then asked "Who are they?"
Tiedemann answered, "Suzie, Chuck, and Scotty." The video recording continued as
follows:
RE [Edwards]: Whose [sic] Suzie?
ET [Tiedemann, crying]: She's the woman I love."
RE: That you love?
ET: Ya.
RE: What happened to her?
[Silence].
ET: / don ft want to talk about it.
RE: You don ft want to talk about it?
ET: No.
ES[Spannl: Edgar?
ET: What.
ES: What don't you want to talk about?
ET: / love that woman so much.
ES: What is it that you don't want to talk about!
[Silence].
ES: You said murders in West Valley, where in West Valley?
ET: . . . inaudible . . . Hummingbird Street.
ES: I'm sorry, where?
ET: 1308 [sic] Hummingbird Street.
ES: 1308 Hummingbird, who lives there?
ET: Me.
RE: Who lives with you?
ET: Suzie and Scotty and they just moved in today or last night, I don't know.
RE: Okay, what don't you want to talk about!
[Silence]
RE: Edgar!
[Silence]
RE: What don't you want to talk about, Ed?
[Silence, Tiedemann crying].
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ES: Edgar, we're not going to force you [to] talk about anything. We're asking
you questions. As Detective Edwards stated, you can answer this question, not
answer that question, answer this question, not answer that question. You don't
have to answer any of our questions at all. You can stop at any time,
ET: Okay.
ES: He made that clear to you, right?
ET: Ya.
ES: Okay. You stated you wanted to talk to us, what part do you and what part
don't you want to talk to us about?
[Silence]
RE: Edgar, do you remember me reading you're rights earlier and you signing a
waiver for us to search your home?
ET: Ya.
RE: Okay, we were called to your home on a gunshot. We got in there and seen
some people. Who shot them?
ET: Me.
RE: You did?
ET: Ya.
RE: Why did you shoot them?
ET: I shot Suzie cause I love her and I shot the other two.
(R. 611, video and transcript at 2-3).
After Tiedemann's invocation and then the confirmation (ET: "I don't want to talk
about it." RE: "You don't want to talk about it?" ET: "No"), officers were required under
the law to cease the interrogation. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 474. Continued questioning was
inappropriate. Statements obtained thereafter "cannot be other than the product of
compulsion, subtle or otherwise." Id; Mayes v. State, 571 S.W.2d 420, 422 (Ark. 1978)
(defendant expressed that he did not want to talk to the officer; continued questioning
constituted a clear violation of Miranda); see also U.S. v. Hernandez, 574 F.2d 1362,
1368 (5th Cir. 1978); U.S. v. Olof, 527 F.2d 752, 753-54 (9th Cir. 1975); Smith, 469 U.S.
at 100 (post-request responses may not be used to cast doubt on a defendant who invokes
his Miranda rights).
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Instead of honoring Tiedemann's request, the officers persisted in their efforts to
wear down his resistance. They repeatedly asked him questions. (R. 611, video and
transcript at 2-3). Even as the officers continued their questions, Tiedemann attempted to
exercise his rights by remaining silent in the face of the officers' inquiries. (R. 611, video
and transcript at 2-4). Yet, the officers were relentless. (Id.)
The officers failed to take measures to ensure that any continued interrogation was
not the result of compulsion or coercion: they failed to wait until a significant period of
time had passed before engaging in further interrogation; they persisted in questioning
Tiedemann about the shootings and particularly about Susan Sessions and the harm to
her; and they failed to present a new recitation of rights per Miranda before they engaged
in further questioning. See Mosely, 423 U.S. at 104-105.
In fact, the officers here misled Tiedemann about his rights. Instead of waiting
and then later providing fresh warnings and obtaining a waiver before continuing (see
Mosely, 423 U.S. at 104-05), the officers advised Tiedemann that he could "answer this
question, not answer that question, answer this question, not answer that question." (R.
611, video and transcript at 2-3). That was deceptive. The officers demonstrated here
that they would not honor a suspect who did not answer questions: they continued to
press Tiedemann after he stated he did not want to talk about the shootings. (Id.) In
addition, the officers' advice was erroneous. If a suspect were to answer some questions
and not others, a court may not construe that act to support an invocation of Miranda
rights. See Davis, 512 U.S. 459 (equivocal statements and actions do not constitute
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invocation of Miranda). The officers provided misleading advice.
After making several efforts to encourage Tiedemann to talk after invoking his
right to remain silent, the officers finally prevailed in luring Tiedemann back into the
conversation by misleading him. (See R. 611, video and transcript at 3). Once
Tiedemann's resistance wore down and they persisted with the interrogation, much of the
interview focused on Susan Session. (See R. 611, video and transcript at 3-10, 12-18, 2027, 29-34, (discussing Suzie)). Thus, where the trial court explicitly determined that
Tiedemann did not want to talk about the harm to "Suzie" (R. 590), it should have
suppressed statements made thereafter. Instead it ruled that all subsequent statements
were admissible. (See R. 590).
Although Tiedemann provided responses to subsequent questions, his responses
cannot be used to support intent to cooperate. Where he invoked the right to remain
silent, a subsequent response cannot be used to undermine the invocation or to render it
vague or ambiguous. See e.g. Smith, 469 U.S. at 97-98 (stating that once a defendant
invokes his rights per Miranda, if officers continue questioning, courts may not look to
the responses to find the invocation ambiguous; subsequent responses must be suppressed
since the officers failed to scrupulously honor the request).
Statements obtained by the officers after Tiedemann invoked the right to remain
silent must be suppressed as violative of Miranda, 384 U.S. at 473-74. In this case, the
trial court failed to properly apply the law. (See R. 590 (refusing to suppress subsequent
statements)). Tiedemann respectfully requests that this Court reverse the trial court ruling
and order suppression of the confessions, where they were unlawful.
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POINT II. THE GOVERNMENTS DESTRUCTION OF EVIDENCE IN A
CRIMINAL CASE DISADVANTAGES A DEFENDANT; FUNDAMENTAL
FAIRNESS REQUIRES DISMISSAL OF A CASE OR SANCTIONS WHEN
THE GOVERNMENT DESTROYS EVIDENCE. ALSO, UNDER A STATE
ANALYSIS, WHEN THE GOVERNMENT DESTROYS EVIDENCE THE
COURT SHOULD APPLY A BALANCING TEST FOR A REMEDY.
A. THE GOVERNMENT'S WILLFUL DESTRUCTION OF EVIDENCE
VIOLATES FEDERAL DUE PROCESS.
The state and federal constitutions provide that a person shall not be deprived of
life, liberty or property without due process of law. U.S. Const, amend. V & XIV, § 1;
Utah Const, art. I, § 7. In a series of decisions, the United States Supreme Court has set
forth the test to determine whether the government's destruction of evidence rises to the
level of a due process violation. In Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), the Court
ruled that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is violated if the
government suppresses material, exculpatory evidence - regardless of whether the
government acted in good or bad faith. Id. at 87.
Next, in California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479 (1984), the Court considered the
constitutional ramifications when officers collected breath samples for intoxilyzer testing,
then destroyed the samples after testing. In Trombetta, the tested samples contained no
apparent exculpatory value to the defendant. Also, officers did not ordinarily preserve
the samples in their day-to-day operations. Id. at 483.
The Supreme Court began its analysis of the matter as follows:
Under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, criminal
prosecutions must comport with prevailing notions of fundamental fairness. We
have long interpreted this standard of fairness to require that criminal defendants
be afforded a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense. To safeguard
that right, the Court has developed "what might loosely be called the area of
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constitutionally guaranteed access to evidence." Taken together, this group of
constitutional privileges delivers exculpatory evidence into the hands of the
accused, thereby protecting the innocent from erroneous conviction and ensuring
the integrity of our criminal justice system.
Id. at 485 (cites omitted).
With regard to preserving evidence, the Court ruled that the government had a
duty to preserve if evidence may play a "significant role in the suspect's defense." IcL at
488. Also, the government would be required to preserve evidence that had apparent
exculpatory value if the defendant would be "unable to obtain" evidence comparable
thereto through "other reasonably available means." Id. In Trombetta, the destruction of
breath samples after testing did not violate due process. The parties there had access to
test results, and the defendants could challenge the results by examining the process even
"without resort to preserved breath samples." Id. at 489-90.
In Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 (1988), the Court considered the failure of
the police to properly preserve untested evidence. In that case, a boy was taken to the
hospital for tests after he was sexually assaulted. Id. at 52-53. A physician treating the
boy collected samples for testing. Id. at 53. Officers also collected the boy's clothing.
The officers refrigerated the specimen samples, but not the clothing. IdL The boy
identified the defendant Youngblood as the assailant, h i
When a criminologist later tested the refrigerated specimen, he concluded that
sexual contact had occurred with the boy. Id. However, later tests for blood type were
inconclusive. Id. at 54. The state disclosed the information to the defense. Id, at 55.
Thereafter, the case went to trial. Youngblood's "principal defense was that the
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boy had erred in identifying him as the perpetrator of the crime." Id. at 54. Experts for
both parties testified as to what technicians may have learned from the samples if they
had tested them shortly after police gathered the evidence or if the police had refrigerated
the clothing. Id. The jury then convicted the defendant and he appealed to the state court.
After reversal there, the government sought review in the United States Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court ruled that for due process purposes, a defendant must show
that police acted in bad faith when they failed to preserve potentially exculpatory
evidence.
We think that requiring a defendant to show bad faith on the part of the police both
limits the extent of the police's obligation to preserve evidence to reasonable
bounds and confines it to that class of cases where the interests of justice most
clearly require it, i.e., those cases in which the police themselves by their conduct
indicate that the evidence could form a basis for exonerating the defendant. We
therefore hold that unless a criminal defendant can show bad faith on the part of
the police, failure to preserve potentially useful evidence does not constitute a
denial of due process of law.
Id. at 58 (emphasis added). Thus, while bad faith is not a consideration when the state
fails to disclose material exculpatory evidence, see Brady, 373 U.S. at 87, "the Due
Process Clause requires a different result when we deal with the failure of the State to
preserve evidentiary material of which no more can be said than that it could have been
subjected to tests, the results of which might have exonerated the defendant."
Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 57; see ateo State v. Gulbransen, 2005 UT 7, ^47, 106 P.3d 734
(stating that under a federal analysis the defendant carries the burden to show that police
acted in bad faith in losing the evidence; also, finding that the defendant never raised the
issue of bad faith and he did not present evidence concerning "the intentions of the police
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officers or the State Crime Lab with regard to the evidence").
In this case, the uncontested facts are as follows: On November 2, 1991, police
collected physical evidence in connection with an investigation into the shootings at 3874
Hummingbird Street. (R. 389; see 477-78, 601). The items included two handguns,
ballistic evidence, "Code R" data from Deborah Sutherland, blood and tissue samples,
gunshot residue tests from Deborah Sutherland and Tiedemann, fingerprints, drugs,
paraphernalia, and items of clothing and bedding. (R. 389; see 477-78, 601; see also
Addendum E, hereto).
Tiedemann ultimately was charged with capital murder. (R. 389, 477). In early
1992, Tiedemann was declared to be incompetent. On June 11, 1992, the state dismissed
the charges. (R. 389; see 477-78; 601). Thereafter, Tiedemann corresponded with the
Salt Lake District Attorney's Office to inquire if prosecutors intended to pursue charges
against him. (R. 389). "The State did not anticipate re-filing the charges because it did
not appear that Tiedemann would ever be found competent. As a result, the West Valley
City Police Department ultimately destroyed the evidence that was collected at the crime
scene." (R. 478). From February 1993, through 1994 most of the physical evidence
related to the case was destroyed without ever being tested. (R. 390; see also 601).
In the fall of 2002, the state learned that Tiedemann would be released from the
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In 1992, Title 77, Chapter 26 discussed the duties of the Bureau of Criminal Identification, in part, to collect information and evidence about individuals accused and convicted
of a crime. In July 1993, those laws were repealed. Today, Title 53, Chapters 1 through
10 concern the collection and retention of evidence in a criminal case. Since those provisions were not in effect when the government destroyed the evidence here, Tiedemann
has not analyzed the government's duty in this case under Utah statutory provisions.
38

Utah State Hospital. (See R. 478; 562-63). Since Tiedemann was unable to get further
treatment from the hospital (see R. 562), the state "re-filed" homicide charges against
him. (See R. 478; 601).
In trial court proceedings, the defense moved to dismiss the charges due to the
destruction of potentially exculpatory evidence. (R. 388-404). The trial court denied the
motion. It ruled that the defense failed to establish bad faith under a federal analysis. (R.
603). That ruling is in error.
The circumstances of this case support that the destruction of evidence constituted
a due process violation. (See R. 388-394). The government acted in bad faith and
destroyed evidence that could play a significant, constitutional role in the defense. (R.
393 (identifying possible value of the evidence to the defense)). Also, the state does not
contest that evidence comparable to that which was collected at the scene cannot be
obtained by any other means. (See R. 477-80).
"Bad faith requires that a defendant prove more than mere negligence; a defendant
must show that 'the police . . . by their conduct indicate that the evidence could form a
basis for exonerating the defendant.1" State v. Holden, 964 P.2d 318, 323 (Utah Ct. App.
1988) (cites omitted), cert, denied, 982 P.2d 88 (Utah 1998). In this case, the government
acted willfully when it destroyed the evidence. This is not a case where the police
gathered information and then failed to refrigerate it (see Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 53), or
destroyed it as a matter of routine after testing (see Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479). In this
case, officers processed a crime scene and collected evidence that they considered to be
relevant to a criminal case. Government agents preserved the evidence for years; after
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Tiedemann was found to be incompetent and the prosecution determined not to proceed
with charges against him, the government destroyed the evidence. (See Addendum E,
hereto). The destruction was deliberate (R. 638:29, 30 (agents determined to destroy the
evidence, and got the "rubber stamp")); the government destroyed potentially exculpatory
evidence with the intent that it would not go to trial. (See e.g. R. 478 (stating that
evidence was destroyed "[a]s a result" of the decision not to proceed with charges)).
The prosecution's decision now to proceed with charges where it has destroyed
most of the evidence is also in bad faith. While the state claims that it is disadvantaged in
its case by the destroyed evidence (see R. 480), it nevertheless has determined to proceed
based on Deborah Southerland's testimony. (See e.g. R. 630). Since Southerland's testimony cannot be analyzed/compared with physical evidence from the scene, Tiedemann is
hampered in his assessment of the matter and in cross-examining the state's key witness
where her testimony may be in conflict with the physical evidence. (See R. 393; 638:25).
The physical evidence had the potential of disproving Southerland's claims or
explanations of how events transpired for cross-examination and confrontation purposes.
See e.g. Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294 (1973) ("The rights to confront and
cross-examine witnesses and to call witnesses in one's own behalf have long been
recognized as essential to due process"). For example, if the ballistics evidence, blood
and tissue samples, gunshot residue and fingerprint evidence were such that it would
support that Southerland was involved in the shootings, that evidence would serve to
impeach Southerland's credibility and her claims regarding Tiedemann's actions. (See
e.g. R. 630:5-37 (claiming that Tiedemann acted alone)). Where she is the primary
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witness for the prosecution in the case, such impeachment evidence would be pertinent to
cross-examination and it likely would have an impact on jurors and the level of the
offense or offenses they may be willing to consider to render a verdict. See Utah Code
Ann. §§ 76-5-203 (Supp. 1991) (defining murder); 76-5-205 (1990) (defining reckless
manslaughter); 76-5-206 (1990) (defining negligent homicide).
The same can be said of the Code R examination. Where Southerland claimed
that Tiedemann sexually assaulted her (R. 630:26-27), information in the Code R may
have shown that Southerland did not suffer trauma, tenderness, redness, or bruising to the
genitalia for forced penetration. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-5-405 & 76-5-406 (1990 &
Supp. 1992) (defining sexual assault as non-consensual and with force, violence, or
coercion). Such physical evidence, again, would be relevant to impeaching Southerland's
credibility for cross-examination and confrontation purposes.
In addition, evidence tying the drugs and paraphernalia to Southerland and other
individuals in the trailer may create doubt in the minds of jurors that Southerland could
accurately observe events as she claimed (R. 630:5-37 (Southerland testified to events
she observed)), or it may provide information concerning the extent to which the actions
of others may have contributed to or caused the shootings. If others made threats to
Tiedemann in their drug-induced state, he may have perceived them to be a danger, for a
lesser offense. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-205 ( 1990) (defining manslaughter).
Without analyses, the defense has no way to demonstrate to the jury that items
collected at the scene failed to corroborate Southerland's claims in the matter, or claims
from investigating witnesses. Where the defendants in Trombetta and Youngblood had
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test results and were able to cross-examine officers and technicians on their testing ability
to assail credibility, none of that is available to Tiedemann.
Finally, physical and potential forensic evidence comparable to that which was
collected at the scene is not available. (R. 638:30-32 (the state acknowledged it is left
with a video of the scene, and statements from officers, the medical examiner, and
witnesses; no physical evidence)).
Tiedemann has demonstrated that his right to a fair trial is impaired by the government's destruction of evidence collected at the scene. He has demonstrated that agents
acted deliberately and in bad faith in destroying preserved evidence; he has demonstrated
the potential relevance of such evidence to his case; and no evidence exists comparable to
that which was destroyed. (R. 388-94; 638:19-25). Tiedemann respectfully requests that
this Court reverse the trial court's ruling and dismiss the charges.
B. UNDER A STATE LAW ANALYSIS, THIS COURT MAY APPLY A
BALANCING TEST FOR A REMEDY WHEN STATE AGENTS DESTROY
POTENTIALLY EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE.
This Court has interpreted the Utah Constitution in ways separate from the federal
constitution. It has relied on the state constitution to more fully protect the citizens of this
State against government action. See e.g. State v. Copeland, 765 P.2d 1266, 1272 (Utah
1988) (relying on art. I, § 7 of the Utah Constitution to strike sentencing provisions); see
also Lee v. Gaufin, 867 P.2d 572, 577 (Utah 1993) (stating that the language of article I,
§ 24 may lead to a different result under a state constitutional analysis); State v. Larocco,
794 P.2d 460, 469-70 (Utah 1990) (construing the Utah Constitution in the area of search
and seizure law); Sims v. Collection Div. of the Utah State Tax Comm'n, 841 P.2d 6, 10,
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14-15 (Utah 1992); State v. Thompson, 810 P.2d 415, 416-18 (Utah 1991).
Utah's due process provision guarantees access to information in proceedings. See
e.g., State v. Howell, 707 P.2d 115, 118 (Utah 1985) (stating that art. I, § 7 requires a
judge to act on reasonably reliable information in sentencing); State v. Brickey, 714 P.2d
644, 647 (Utah 1986); see also Labrum v. Bd of Pardons, 870 P.2d 902, 909 (Utah 1993)
(ensuring access to information for inmate board hearings under Utah's provision).
Also, this Court has ruled that fundamental fairness requires that procedures in the
guilt phase of a criminal case "be designed to insure that the decision-making process is
based on accurate information." State v. Lipsky, 608 P.2d 1241, 1248 (Utah 1980). State
due process bars the use of potentially unreliable information at trial. See State v.
Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 779-80 (Utah 1991) (concluding that the standard for
admissibility of eyewitness identification under art. I, § 7 of the Utah Constitution
diverges from the standard under the federal due process clause). In addition, it
guarantees an accused the right, among other things, to "submit evidence, examine and
cross-examine witnesses." Christiansen v. Harris, 163 P.2d 314, 315 & 317 (Utah 1945).
This Court has stated that "the mandate of the due process clause of article I, section 7 of the Declaration of Rights in the Utah Constitution is comprehensive in its application to all activities of state government. It is the province of the judiciary to assure that
a claim of the denial of due process by an arm of government be heard and, if justified,
that it be vindicated." Foote v. Ut. Bd. of Pardons, 808 P.2d 734, 735 (Utah 1991).
In the event this Court is not persuaded that the record here supports that government agents acted in bad faith when they destroyed evidence related to the scene,
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Tiedemann urges this Court to undertake an analysis independent from that developed
under the federal constitution. See State v. Laffertv, 749 P.2d 1239, 1247 n.5 (Utah
1988) (recognizing this Court will engage in a state constitutional analysis if a party
presents an argument for a different analysis under the state provision), vacated on other
grounds, Lafferty v. Cook, 949 F.2d 1546 (10th Cir. 1991). This Court may ensure
fundamental fairness to the defendant under article I, section 7. See Hulbert v. State, 607
P.2d 1217, 1223 (Utah 1980) (stating that the provisions of the constitution ensuring due
process are designed to protect the individual from state action "and not the converse").
Specifically, this Court may reject the Youngblood approach. It may recognize
that due process is not concerned just with bad faith actions. State due process ensures
fundamental fairness. See e.g. State v. Morgan, 2001 UT 87,1J15, 34 P.3d 767 (fundamental fairness is the touchstone of due process). A function of fundamental fairness is
.
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to preserve the "integrity of the process itself." Labrum, 870 P.2d at 909.
To that end, where the state has destroyed potentially exculpatory evidence in a
case, it is unreasonable to have the due process analysis hinge on one factor: whether the
defendant was able to prove that the government acted in bad faith. Youngblood, 488
U.S. at 58. That requirement is particularly onerous where the defendant did not collect
the evidence, he was not involved in the decision to prosecute based on the evidence, he
was not in control of the evidence or the case, and he did not destroy or mishandle the
evidence. Generally the defendant is not in a position to prove the reasons for destruction
or the significance of the evidence to the case. (See R. 401; 638:26 (arguing that the state
was in possession and control of the information regarding the evidence)).
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The state is in the best position to make the relevant showings. The state's agents
collected and handled the evidence, and observed the condition of the evidence at the
time it was collected. The state agents have personal knowledge concerning the
evidence, how it would have related to trial, and how it appeared before destruction. (R.
638:29, 30, 31 (stating that the state agents and officers collected the evidence and
destroyed it)). The state agents are in possession of information regarding the evidence,
particularly its significance to the case and its reasons for destruction. See e.g. State v.
Smith, 2005 UT 57, Tf 19, 122 P.3d 615 (stating that the party in the better position to
prove the matter must bear the burden; defendant must bear the initial burden of proving
an affirmative defense); State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 916-18, 921 (Utah 1987) (stating
that even it the prosecution acted in good faith when it failed to produce items in discovery, it carries the burden to show why the failure did not prejudice the defense).
In a pre-Youngblood case, this Court did not require the defendant to prove that
the government acted in bad faith when it destroyed evidence. 5See State v. Shaffer, 725
P.2d 1301 (Utah 1986). It considered and balanced several factors to determine whether
the government's destruction of evidence violated due process. Id. at 1304-06.
In Shaffer, 725 P.2d 1301, the defendant claimed his rights were violated under
article I, section 7 and the federal constitution when the state cremated the victim's body
before the defendant could analyze the victim's hands for the presence of gunpowder
residue, id. at 1304-05. The defendant asserted that he was denied the opportunity to test
the hands, Id. at 1304; and he claimed that the state's failure to adequately investigate the
body violated his rights to a fair trial. Id.
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In assessing the matter, this Court considered several factors. It recognized that
the government had a duty to preserve evidence and to disclose it to the defendant. See
id. at 1304-05, 1306. It stated that the "intent or purpose of the prosecution in destroying
the evidence is irrelevant," id. at 1305; and it assessed the significance of the destroyed
evidence, as demonstrated in testimony from agent Donald Havekost and the medical
examiner. kL at 1304-05 (stating that the state's witnesses explained that gunpowder
deposits on the victim's hands would be insignificant due to several circumstances
surrounding the condition of the body). Also, in connection with the defendant's claim
concerning the state's failure to investigate, the Court considered the state's reasons for
disposing of the body as permitted by law, and whether the defendant established prejudice. See id. at 1306. Based on an assessment of several considerations, this Court
determined that the destruction of evidence did not violate due process. Id. at 1305-07.
Where this Courl did not require the defendant in Shaffer to prove that the government acted in bad faith when it destroyed evidence, see id., it should not now require
such a showing under a due process analysis for the state constitution. See Utah Const,
art. I, § 7; (see R. 394, 399-400 (requesting that the trial court reject Youngblood's
onerous requirement that the defendant prove bad faith; arguing that other considerations
may be relevant to ensure fundamental fairness; and citing to jurisdictions that have
adopted a balancing approach)). This Court may interpret Utah's due process provision
to require the trial court to consider and balance several factors for a remedy when the
state destroys potentially exculpatory evidence.
Courts in other jurisdictions have rejected the Youngblood litmus test of one factor
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in favor of a separate state analysis. See e.g. Thorne v. Dept of Pub. Safety, 774 P.2d
1326, 1331 (Alaska 1989); State v. Morales, 657 A.2d 585, 593 (Conn. 1995) (rejecting
the litmus test of bad faith set forth in Youngblood, and adopting a balancing test, which
weighs the reasons for the unavailability of the evidence against the degree of prejudice
to the defendant); State v. Ferguson, 2 S.W.3d 912, 916-17 (Tenn. 1999) ("Because we
deem the preservation of the defendant's fundamental right to a fair trial to be a
paramount consideration here, we join today those jurisdictions which have rejected the
Youngblood analysis"); State v. Osakalumi, 461 S.E.2d 504, 511, 512 (W. Va. 1995)
(holding that state constitutional due process and fundamental fairness require a rejection
of Youngblood); State v. Delisle, 648 A.2d 632, 642-43 (Vt. 1994) (rejecting Youngblood
based on state constitutional grounds); Commonwealth v. Henderson, 582 N.E.2d 496,
497 (Mass. 1991); Hammond v. State, 569 A.2d 81 (Del. 1989) (refusing to adopt
Youngblood approach; applying a balancing test).
In Hammond v. State, 569 A.2d 81, the defendant was charged with vehicular
homicide as a result of an accident where his two companions were killed. Id. at 83-84.
The defendant was found in the driver's seat, and he told police at the hospital that he was
the driver, hi At trial, he denied that he drove, and an expert testified that the force of
the impact may have caused the operator and passenger to switch places. Id at 84-85.
An examination of the vehicle would have been important to the defense. However, the
police no longer had the vehicle. See id. at 85.
In considering the due process question, the Delaware court refused to adopt the
Youngblood approach. See id. at 87. Instead it affirmed an analysis under the state
47

constitution that evaluated the matter in the context of the entire case. Id. at 85-87. It
considered whether the evidence at issue would have been material and discoverable
under Brady or state law. Id. at 86. Also, the duty to preserve and the consequences of
destroying evidence turned on several factors.
First, the court would consider the government's culpability in destroying the
evidence. It stated, "[w]hen evidence has not been preserved, the conduct of the State's
agents is a relevant consideration, but it is not determinative." Id. at 87. That is, the
analysis would not hinge on the good or bad faith of the agent.
Second, the court would consider the significance of the missing evidence and the
availability of secondary evidence. Id. at 87. Third, it would consider the sufficiency of
the evidence to sustain a conviction. Id. Even with sufficient evidence, if the state
breached its duty to preserve, defendant may be entitled to a remedy. See id. at 86, 90.
Tiedemann urges this Court to adopt a balancing test under the Utah Constitution.
See Utah Const, art. I, §7; see also Trombetta, 467 U.S. at 491 ("Rules concerning
preservation of evidence are generally matters of state, not federal constitutional law")
(O'Connor, J., concurring). Such an analysis would evaluate the destruction of
potentially useful evidence in the context of the entire case. It would balance the
defendant's due process concerns with the state's interests in the proceedings; and it
would balance the state's conduct against the degree of prejudice to the defendant.
Under a balancing approach, the government's negligence/culpability in destroying
the evidence would be only one factor. The trial court would also consider the
government's duty to preserve evidence, the significance of the destroyed evidence, the
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sufficiency of the remaining evidence, and the remedy available to the defendant.
Hammond, 569 A.2d at 87-90.
Applying those standards here, government agents collected evidence at the scene
and preserved it for more than a year after the shootings. (See R. 478; 638:30-31). The
government had a duty to preserve the evidence. See Shaffer, 725 P.2d at 1306 (stating
that the prosecution has a duty "to preserve that [evidence] which comes into [the
prosecutor's] possession either as a tangible object or sense impression, if it is reasonably
apparent the object or sense impression potentially constitute [sic] material evidence"
(cite omitted)). The evidence would have been discoverable under Utah law. See Utah R.
Crim. P. 16; (R. 25-27 (requesting Brady evidence, physical evidence and test results)).
In this case, the government destroyed the evidence "[a]s a result" of the
prosecutions' decision not to pursue charges. (R. 478; 638:30 (stating the evidence got
the "rubber stamp" for destruction)). Evidence was destroyed without ever being tested.
Tiedemann maintains that the evidence would have been significant to his case.
Physical evidence from the scene and forensic evidence may serve to discredit the state's
key witness or statements made by investigating officers about the scene. Such evidence
may provide the basis for cross-examination and confrontation, or it may support a lesser
offense or acquittal. See e.g. State v. Mead, 2001 UT 58, ^(37, 27 P.3d 1115 (recognizing
that a state witness acknowledged on cross-examination at defendant's trial for murder
that the "physical evidence was consistent with either an accident or a homicide").
If physical evidence serves to discredit the state's key witness or to impeach her
testimony, that would be relevant to the jury in making credibility determinations about
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the witness. Impeachment evidence can play a pivotal role. Where such impeachment
evidence has been destroyed by the government, the lack of evidence may mean the
difference between a guilty verdict, a verdict on a lesser offense, or an acquittal. Thus,
the destruction of such evidence would be prejudicial to a defendant. See e.g. State v.
Martin, 2002 UT 34, ^48, 44 P.3d 805 (recoginizing that impeachment evidence may impact on a jury's assessment and discredit the state's witness; thus, there is a likelihood of
an outcome more favorable to the defendant). Defendant would be entitled to a remedy.
To ensure due process under the circumstances, Tiedemann is entitled to a process
that considers and balances several factors, including the agents' destruction of
discoverable evidence, the significance of such evidence, the prejudice to the defendant,
and an appropriate remedy. See e.g. Hammond, 569 A.2d at 86-87.
Tiedemann respectfully requests that this Court adopt such an analysis under the
Utah Constitution, and remand this case for further proceedings on the matter. (See R.
394, 397-98, 399-400 (arguing that the Youngblood analysis fails to adequately protect
defendant's due process concerns; requesting a separate analysis under article I, section 7;
citing to jurisdictions that have adopted the balancing approach)).
CONCLUSION
Tiedemann respectfully requests that this Court order suppression of the
confessions, where the officers' interrogation violated the law; and he respectfully
requests further proceedings to demonstrate a due process violation under the Utah
Constitution, where the state destroyed potentially exculpatory evidence.
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ADDENDUM A

FILED
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS

OCT Z * 2005
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

00O00

The State of Utah,
Respondent,
v.

Case No. 20050676-SC

Edgar Tiedeman,
Petitioner.

ORDER
This matter is before the court upon a Petition for
Permission to Appeal an Interlocutory Order, filed on October 17,
2005.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, pursuant to Rule 5 of the Utah Rules
of Appellate Procedure, the Petition is granted.
This matter shall be consolidated for briefing and argument
with the prior appeal in this case. A briefing schedule will be
established hereafter. In the prior order granting permission to
appeal an interlocutory order, this Court inadvertently included
language suspending the provision of rule 26(a) that permits the
parties to stipulate to an extension of time to submit their
briefs on the merits. That portion of the prior order is here
revoked. The briefing shall be governed by the Appellate Rules
as currently in effect, and by future orders, if any, of this
Court.

FOR THE COURT:

Date

Michael J. Wilkins
Associate Chief Justice

FILED
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS

OCT 17 2005
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
00O00

The State of Utah,
Respondent,
Case No. 20050676-SC

v.
Edgar Tiedeman,
Petitioner,

ORDER
This matter is before the court upon a Petition for
Permission to Appeal an Interlocutory Order, filed on August 10,
2005.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, pursuant to Rule 5 of the Utah Rules
of Appellate Procedure, the Petition is granted only as to the
first three issues presented. The Petition is denied with
respect to the fourth issue because Petitioner failed to document
any order issued on the Motion to Dismiss Based on Destruction of
Exculpatory Evidence.
A briefing schedule will be established hereafter. Pursuant
to rule 2, the court suspends the provision of rule 26(a) that
permits the parties to stipulate to an extension of time to
submit their briefs on the merits. The parties shall not be
permitted to stipulate to an extension. Additionally, absent
extraordinary circumstances, no extensions will be granted by
motion. The parties shall comply with the briefing schedule upon
its issuance.
FOR THE COURT:

Z/rfT
Date

Michael J. Wilkins
Associate Chief Justice

ADDENDUM B

U.S. CONSTITUTION
AMENDMENT V
[Criminal actions — Provisions concerning — Due process
of law and just compensation clauses.]
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases
arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in
time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for
public use, without just compensation.

AMENDMENT VI
[Rights of accused.]
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the
crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of
counsel for his defence.

AMENDMENTS

Amend. XIV, § 3

AMENDMENT XIV
Section
1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal
protection.]
2. [Representatives — Power to reduce appointment.]
3. [Disqualification to hold office.]

Section
4. [Public debt not to be questioned — Debts of
the Confederacy and claims not
to be paid.]
5. [Power to-enforce amendment.]

Section 1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal
protection.]
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

UTAH CONSTITUTION
Sec. 7. [Due process of law.]
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due
of law.

ADDENDUM C
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
vs.

:

MEMORANDUM DECISION

:

CASE NO. 021912452

s

EDGAR TIEDEMANN,

:

Defendant.

:

This matter is before the Court on defendant's Motion to
Suppress Illegally Obtained Statements.

The Motion raises three

legal issues. First, whether defendant invoked his Miranda
second,

whether

defendant's

confession

was

rights;

involuntary;

and

finally, whether defendant was competent during his interrogation.
FACTS
Detective Ron Edwards ("Det. Edwards") and Sergeant Ed Spann
("Sgt. Spann") of the West Valley Police Department, began the
interrogation of defendant, Edgar Tiedemann, on November 2, 1991,
at 1:58 p.m.

Det. Edwards began by asking the defendant to sign

the paper placed before him and explained for the benefit of the
camera and the defendant that defendant had received his
rights and was not intoxicated.

Miranda

The defendant corrected Det.

Edwards, stating that he was intoxicated on Toluene.

Det. Edwards

asked the defendant how long he had been intoxicated on Toluene and
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the defendant responded, stating "since 1962."
was

incapable

of

understanding

or

When asked if he

answering

questions,

the

defendant responded, "Sometimes, I don't know." At this point, the
tape stopped and started again at 2:13 p.m.
Det. Edwards read the defendant his Miranda

rights.

The

defendant said that he was intoxicated on Toluene and confirmed
that he was willing to answer questions with the police and did so
voluntarily.

The defendant continued the interrogation with his

head lowered, and he infrequently looked up into the camera.
When Det. Edwards asked, "What happened to her (Suzie)?" the
defendant said,

"I don't want to talk about it."

Immediately

afterward, when asked, "What don't you want to talk about?" he
remained

silent.

Immediately

thereafter, when asked,

"Who is

Suzie?" he responded without delay, "The woman that I love."

The

defendant

the

readily

answered

other

questions

throughout

interrogation, except when asked, "What happened to Suzie?"
The defendant did not remember the day of the week even though
Det. Edwards told him the date at the beginning of the interview,
and he did not remember if the victims moved in his house during
the day or night.

The defendant

did provide

several

complex

answers during the interrogation, including the license number and
make of his car, the year he had his stroke, the physical effects
of his stroke and other detailed information.
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When responding to Det. Edwards1 question if he had any mental
problems, the defendant said "Ya.

All kinds.

See, I think I'm

Adolph Hitler. Adolph Hitler died in May of 1945 and I was born in
19, October 1946.

I think I'm Adolph Hitler."

When asked by Det.

Edwards if he heard voices, the defendant stated, "I think so. I
don't know."

When asked by Det. Edwards who was telling him to

shoot them, the defendant responded, "the devil."

The defendant

also responded that he was a religious person.
The defendant's interview ended at 2:58 p.m., having lasted
just under one hour.

During the interview, he did not request a

break, did not directly request to stop the interview or request to
have an attorney present.
ANALYSIS
"The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides
that no State shall

"deprive any person of life, liberty, or

property, without due process of law.1" Colorado v. Connelly, 479
U.S. 157, 163

(1986) .

A defendant in custody has the right to

remain silent, the right to have an attorney present and the right
to stop an interrogation at any time. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436 (1964).

Under the Due Process Clause, "certain interrogation

techniques,

either

in

isolation

or

as

applied

to

the

unique

characteristics of a particular suspect, are so offensive to a
civilized system of justice that they must be condemned."

Id.
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"Voluntariness" is not the sole consideration when considering
whether admission of a confession violates the Fifth or Fourteenth
Amendment.

State v. Rettenberger, 984 P.2d 1009, 1013 (Utah 1999).

"Coercive police activity is a necessary predicate to the finding
that a confession is not vvoluntary.'" Connelly, 479 U.S. at 167.
Analysis of whether a confession is admissible must consider the
"totality of circumstances" to determine if the confession was
"made freely, voluntarily and without compulsion or inducement of
any sort."
"totality

Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 689 (1993).
of

the

circumstances"
the

accused

takes

into

and

the

account
details

The

"both the

characteristics

of

of

the

interrogation."

State v. Strain, 779 P.2d 221, 225 (Utah 1989).

"Courts must consider such external factors as the duration of the
interrogation, the persistence of the officers, police trickery,
absence of family and counsel, and threats and promises made to the
defendant by the officers."

Rettenberger, 984 P.2d at 1013.

"Courts must also consider such factors as the defendant's
mental health, mental deficiency, emotional instability, education,
age,

and familiarity with the judicial system."

Id. at 1014.

Accordingly, the Utah Supreme Court states, "a defendant's mental
condition

is

not

in

itself

sufficient

to

make

a

confession

involuntary."

Id.

The mental state of a defendant "is relevant to
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the extent it made him more susceptible to mentally coercive police
tactics."

Id.

The court sets forth objective and subjective factors that a
court

should

consider

when

circumstances" examination.
include

police

threats

and

conducting
Id.

misrepresentation,

promises

and

other

a

"totality

at 1015.

Objective

the

friend

false

factors

such

as

of

the

factors

technique,

"whether

the

defendant is subject to extended periods of incommunicado." id. at
1015-1018.

In explaining

subjective

factors, the court

lists

whether the interrogators deny any of the defendant's requests,
whether

the defendant

system,

whether

psychological

the

had prior
defendant

manipulation,

experience

was

with

particularly

or whether

the

judicial

vulnerable

to

the defendant was more

susceptible to stress and coercion than the average person. Jd. at
1019-1020.
I.

Violation of

Miranda

The defense argues the defendant affirmatively invoked his
right to remain silent, and that right was violated when police
detectives continued his interrogation.

The defendant cites State

v. Guiterrez, 864 P.2d 894, 897 (Utah App. 1993), to show that an
effective initial waiver of the right to remain silent does not
nullify a suspect's ability to subsequently
during the course of an interrogation.

invoke this right

In Guiterrez, when the
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defendant said, "I ain't going to say nothing," the Utah Court of
Appeals found the defendant invoked his Miranda

rights.

Id.

In

Guiterrez, with continued questions and the police interrogator's
suggestion that he was only using self-defense, the defendant was
provoked into a confession.

Id.

Guiterrez is distinguishable

because the interrogators were more forceful and suggestive in
their questioning and the defendant was referring to the entire
interview, not a particular question.
Here, the defendant did not want to talk about the specific
bodily harm to Suzie, but was otherwise cooperative and willing to
talk to the interrogators.
that

he

understood

his

The defendant answered affirmatively

Miranda

rights, he

refused

to

answer

questions regarding the bodily harm that was inflicted upon Suzie,
but unhesitatingly answered all other questions.

His purposeful

silence lasted only a brief period of time and only to questions
regarding bodily injury to Suzie.

He did not indicate, at any

time, that he wished to stop the interrogation.
Accordingly, the Court finds that the defendant did not invoke
his Miranda

rights.

Therefore, the Court need not reach the issue

of whether the defendant's statements are still admissible for
purposes of impeachment.

II.
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Involuntary Statements

The defense argues that the defendant's statements were not
made

voluntarily,

in

violation

of

federal

due

process.

In

analyzing whether the defendant's confession is voluntary, the
Court will address both the objective and subjective factors of the
defendant•s interrogation.
a.

Police Misrepresentation, False Friend Technique, Threats

or Promises and Other Objective Factors
The defense argues the defendant's interrogation was subject
to police coercion due to questionable interrogation techniques.
Specifically, the defense cites Rettenberger to show the use of
false friend technique, mental coercion, the lack of presence of
counsel, family or friends.

984 P. 2d at 1013.

Rettenberger is

clearly distinguishable in that the police coercion was much more
extensive.

Here, the interrogators did not make use of false

statements or half-truths.

They did not use the false friend

technique by implying they were acting in the best interest of the
defendant by the simple use of his first name.

The detectives did

not use any threats or promises to entice the defendant into a
confession.

The entire interrogation took place within one hour,

and during the investigation the interrogators did not deny any
special requests of the defendant.
ethical misconduct by the police.

There is no evidence of any

In short, the record shows that
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the detective's interrogation was absent of suggestive and coercive
techniques.
method

The Court finds no reason to believe the interrogation

used

techniques

that

were

sufficient

to

render

Make

Defendant

the

defendant's confession involuntary.
b.

Subjective

Factors

That

the

More

Susceptible to Manipulation
Turning to a review of the subjective factors that may make
the defendant more susceptible to manipulation is a more difficult
process than reviewing for police misconduct.

The defense argues

that the defendant's diminished mental capacity, the influence of
drugs, his references to Hitler and Satan, and his lack of verbal
skills and ability to express himself deem the defendant incapable
of a voluntary confession.
The

defendant's

prolonged

use

of

Toluene,

the

stroke

he

suffered in 1982, or a head injury received as a child might be the
cause

of

his

generalized

cerebral

damage

resulting

impairment of intellectual functions and an 82 I.Q.
Support of Defendant's Motion to Suppress, p. 14.)

in

severe

(Memorandum in
The defendant's

reference that he believes he is Adolph Hitler indicates that he
knows Hitler is dead and he does not have an actual belief that he
is Hitler.
criminal

act

His reference to Satan telling him to commit the
may

also

stem

from

his

religious

beliefs.

"A

perception of coercion flowing from the "voice of God' is a matter
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to which the Federal Constitution does not speak."

Connelly, 479

U.S. at 517. In reviewing defendant's interrogation it is evident
he did not answer all questions intelligently. On the other hand,
the defendant provided clear and detailed answers to many of the
questions.
III.

Incompetent
The defense

argues

that

the defendant

was

incompetent,

rendering him incapable of voluntarily and knowingly waiving his
constitutional rights at the time of his interrogation.

The

defense cites Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 207 (1960), where
the Supreme Court held the defendant's confession involuntary and
reversed the conviction. There the defendant had a long history of
mental illness, was interrogated for eight to nine hours in a small
room filled with police officers with no relatives or counsel
present and his confession was written by a police officer.

The

court found that the defendant was "insane" before, during and
after the robbery.

At the time of the robbery he was absent

without authorization from a mental ward, where he had been placed
due

to

his

Veteran's

Administration

classification

of

100%

incompetence resulting from a diagnosis of "schizophrenic reactive,
paranoid type." Id. at 201. The factors addressed by the court in
Blackburn are not present in the instant case.

Prior to his
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interrogation,

defendant

PAGE 10
had

not

MEMORANDUM DECISION
been

found

incompetent

or

"insane," and similar coercive factors were absent.
Considering the totality of the circumstances surrounding the
defendant's

interrogation,

including

his

treatment

by

the

detectives and his mental state, the Court finds his confession did
not violate his Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment
admissible.

rights and is

The Motion to Suppress is denied.

/
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
vs.

:

MEMORANDUM DECISION

:

CASE NO. 021912452

:

EDGAR TIEDEMANN,
Defendant.

:
:

This matter is before the Court on defendant's Motion to Quash
Count

III, or, Alternatively,

Motion to Amend

Count

III, and

defendant's Motion to Dismiss Based on Destruction of Exculpatory
Evidence.

This Court has reviewed the Memoranda of counsel and

heard oral argument on these Motions.
I.

DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO QUASH COUNT III, OR ALTERNATIVELY

MOTION TO AMEND COUNT III
Defendant argues that Count III of the Information, the count
that alleges Murder of Scott Liam Bunnell, Jr., should be dismissed
because the State failed to show probable cause at the preliminary
hearing.

At the preliminary hearing, Deborah Southerland Pryor

testified that on the evening in question she was in the bedroom of
defendant's trailer when he came in, shot several times into the
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She heard several shots fired

in the front room, and subsequently went out to the front room and
observed Mr. Bunnell's injuries.

In addition, the State submitted

an autopsy by Dr. Edward Leis, completed after Mr. Bunnell's death
in 2001.

The autopsy concluded that Mr. Bunnell had died from

complications of paraplegia caused by the gunshot wound inflicted
by defendant.
At

a

preliminary

hearing

"the

prosecution

must

present

sufficient evidence to support a reasonable belief that an offense
has been committed and that the defendant committed it."
Clark, 20 P. 3d 300

(Utah 2001) .

State v.

At a preliminary hearing "the

magistrate must view all evidence in the light most favorable to
the prosecution and must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of
the prosecution."
2000) .

State v. Hester, 3 P. 3d 725, 728

(Utah App.

This Court finds that evidence produced by the State at

preliminary hearing was sufficient to bind over Count III.

In the

alternative, the defendant has moved the Court to amend Count III
to Attempted Homicide.
evidence

to bind

over

Having found that there is sufficient
Count

III

on

the greater

alternative Motion need not be addressed.
Motion is denied.

offense,

the

Therefore, defendant's
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II. MOTION TO DISMISS BASED ON DESTRUCTION OF EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE
Defendant has moved this Court to dismiss the charges against
him based on the State's "willful destruction of all potentially
exculpatory evidence."
Defendant argues that the destruction of the evidence is in
violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United
States

Constitution

and

Article

I,

Section

12, of

the

Utah

Constitution.
In 1991, defendant was charged with two counts of Aggravated
Murder, one count of Attempted Aggravated Murder, one count of
Aggravated Kidnapping, and one Count of Aggravated Sexual Assault.
All charges were dismissed on June 11, 1992, after defendant was
found incompetent to stand trial. After that time, numerous items,
including handguns, ballistic evidence, "Code R" data, blood and
tissue samples, gunshot residue tests, fingerprints, drugs and
paraphernalia,

and clothing

and bedding

items were destroyed.

These items were destroyed sometime between 1993 and 1994.

In

2002, defendant was found competent to stand trial and charges were
re-filed.

Defendant is now charged with three counts of Criminal

Homicide, Murder, all first degree felonies.
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law, a defendant's

due process

rights

are

violated if evidence destroyed has "exculpatory value that was
apparent before the evidence was destroyed and [is] of such nature
that the defendant would be unable to obtain comparable evidence by
other reasonably available means."
U.S.

479,

489

material, and
exculpated

(1984) .

The

California v. Trombetta, 467

destroyed

"the possibility

that

evidence

the

also

must

be

[evidence] could have

[defendant] if preserved or tested is not enough to

satisfy the standard of constitutional materiality."
Youngblgod,

488

U.S.

51,

58

(1988) .

If

Arizona v.

evidence

is

only

potentially useful, defendant bears the burden to show that police
acted in bad faith in not preserving the evidence.

Id.

"Bad

faith requires that a defendant prove more than mere negligence; a
defendant must show that 'the police...by their conduct indicate
that

the

evidence

defendant.'"

could

form

a

basis

for

exonerating

the

State v. Holden. 964 P.2d 318, 323 (Utah App. 1988)

(quoting Youngblood, at 109).
Defendant asserts that "bad faith should be presumed in this
case

unless

and

until

the

government

is

able

explanation for the destruction of this evidence."
Memorandum at pp. 6-7.

to

offer

an

Defendant's

Defendant misstates the legal requirement.
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the burden is upon the defendant to show that the

State acted in bad faith in destroying the aforementioned property.
The defendant has failed to meet that burden.
Defendant further argues that under the Utah Constitution,
Article I, Section 12, defendant is afforded a higher degree of
protection than under the Federal Constitution.

The State argues

that defendant's argument lacks merit because Utah has adopted the
United States Supreme Court's standard.
support for the State's argument.

This Court cannot find

Both cases cited by the State in

support, State v. Bakalov, 979 P.2d 799 (Utah 1999), and State v.
Holden, 964 P.2d 318

(Utah App. 1998), were based on the state

courts adhering to federal precedent when issues are argued under
the Federal Constitution.
appellate

Defendant correctly notes that Utah

courts on occasion have been willing

to consider a

different interpretation of Utah Constitution, Article I, Section
14, than the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution
addressing the matter of search and seizure.
Court

has

stated,

"choosing

to give

the

The Utah Supreme

Utah

Constitution

a

somewhat different construction may prove to be an appropriate
method for insulating the state's citizens from the vagaries of
inconsistent interpretations given to the Fourth Amendment by the

STATE V. TIEDEMANN
federal courts."
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State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460 (1990), (quoting

State v. Watts, 750 P.2d 1219, at n.8 (Utah 1988)).
In State v. Bobo, 803 P.2d 1268, 1272-73, n. 5 (Utah App.
1990), the Utah Court of Appeals suggested a three-prong analysis
in determining whether the Utah Constitution should be interpreted
differently

from

Constitution.

a

similar

provision

in

the

United

States

First, the moving party should analyze the "unique

context in which Utah's Constitution developed", second, "should
demonstrate the willingness of state appellate courts to regularly
interpret textually similar state constitution provisions

in a

manner different from federal interpretation of the United States
Constitution, and that

it is entirely proper to do so in the

federal system," and third, the moving party should cite to "other
states supporting the particular construction urged by counsel."
id.
In

the

instant

concerning

the

developed,

nor

case,

unique

defendant

context

shown why

this

in

has

offered

no

which

Utah's

Constitution

State's

Constitution

analysis

should

be

interpreted differently than the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of
the United States Constitution.
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In addition, defendant has made reference to numerous cases in
other

state

jurisdictions

that

have

"rejected

Younqblood".

However, defendant has not articulated the rulings of other states
correctly.

For example, in

State v. Morales , 657 A.2d 585, 594

(Conn. 1995), the Connecticut Supreme Court concluded:
That the good or bad faith of the police in failing to
preserve
potentially
useful
evidence
cannot
be
dispositive of whether a criminal defendant has been
deprived of due process of law. Accordingly, we, too,
reject the litmus test of bad faith on the part of police
which the United States Supreme Court adopted under the
Federal Constitution and Younqblood.
Rather, in
determining whether a defendant has been afforded due
process of law under the state constitution, the trial
court must employ...[a] balancing test, weighing the
reasons for the unavailability of the evidence against
the degree of prejudice to the accused.
More
specifically, the trial court must balance the totality
of the circumstances surrounding the missing evidence,
including the following factors:
The materiality of
missing
evidence,
the
likelihood
of
mistaken
interpretation of it by witnesses or the jury, the reason
for its nonavailability to the defense, and the prejudice
to the defendant caused by the unavailability of the
evidence.
(Quoting
State v. Asherman, 478 A.2d 227
(1984)).
In the instant case, defendant has only urged this Court to
reject the bad faith Younqblood standard, but he has not suggested
a viable alternative standard.
Because defendant has failed to offer a Utah Constitutional
basis, nor a viable alternative to Younqblood based on the Utah

STATE V. TIEDEMANN
Constitution,
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Court

cannot

MEMORANDUM DECISION
appropriately

address

the

constitutional issue. Therefore, this Court finds defendant's Utah
Constitutional argument inadequate.
Accordingly, having
basis

nor

Utah

found no United

Constitutional

basis

to

States

Constitutional

dismiss

this

case,

defendant's Motion to Dismiss based upon destruction of exculpatory
evidence is denied.
Dated this

rf

day of September, 2005.

m

UDITH S.f ^^^EfitBRTON
I STRICT SOTDKT JUPGE ~

I

A\

rio
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I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Memorandum Decision, to the following, this,
September, 2 005:

T. Langdon Fisher
Deputy District Attorney
Attorney for Plaintiff
111 E. Broadway, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Heidi Anne Buchi
Patrick W. Corum
Heather Brereton
Attorney for Defendant
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

day of

ADDENDUM E

FILED
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

DEC 1 2 2005

ooOoo
State of Utah,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.

Case No.

20050676-SC
021912452

Edgar Tiedemann,
Defendant and Petitioner.

ORDER
The court grants the Petitioners' stipulated motion to
supplement the record on appeal with the true and correct copy
of the "Property Disposition Inquiry Report", which was
originally included as a Addendum to the Defendant's " Motion to
Dismiss Based on Destruction of Evidence," a copy of which is
attached to the motion.
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TAPED INTERVIEW
EDGAR TIEDEMANN
NOVEMBER 2, 1991
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RE:

....at 1991, the time is 2:15 PM. I'm Detective Ron Edwards,
West Valley Police Department. Sgt. Ed Spann with the West
Valley Police Department. I have to read you your rights per
miranda. Do you understand that?

ET:

Ya.

RE:

You have the right to remain silent. Anything you say can and
will be used against you in a court of law. You have the
right to have a lawyer present before any questioning. Do you
understand that?

ET:

...inaudible...

RE:

Do you understand that you can stop this questioning at
anytime?

ET:

Ya.

RE:

If you cannot afford an attorney, we will provide one for you.
Do you understand that?

ET

Ya.

RE

Do you still wish to speak to us at this time?

ET

Ya.

RE

Are you intoxicated?

ET

On toluene.

RE

What's toluene?

ET

Toluene.

RE

It's a paint thinner?

ET

Ya.

RE

Okay, do you know why we're going to talk to you?

ET

Ya.

RE

What are we going to talk to you about?

It's, it•s a paint thinner.
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ET:

The murders out there.

RE:

What murders?

ET:

The murders out there at West Valley.

RE:

Who are they?

ET:

Suzie, Chuck and Scotty.

RE:

Whose Suzie?

ET:

She's the woman I love.

RE:

That you love?

ET:

Ya.

RE:

What happened to her?

ET:

I don't want to talk about it.

RE:

You don't want to talk about it?

ET:

No.

ES:

Edgar?

ET:

What.

ES:

Why don't you want to talk about it?

ET:

I love that woman so much.

ES:

What is it that you don't want to talk about?
murders in West Valley, where in West Valley?

ET:

.... inaudible....Hummingbird Street.

ES:

I'm sorry, where?

ET:

13 08 Hummingbird Street.

ES:

13 08 Hummingbird, who lives there?

ET:

Me.

You said
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RE:

Who lives with you?

ET:

Suzie and Scotty and they just moved in last night, I don't
know.

RE:

Okay, what don't you want to talk about?
you want to talk about, Ed?

ES:

Edgar, we're not going to force you talk about anything.
We're asking you questions. As Detective Edwards stated, you
can answers this questions, not answer that question, answer
this question, not answer that question. You don't have to
answer any of our questions at all. You can stop at anytime.

ET:

Okay.

ES:

He made that clear to you, right?

ET:

Ya.

ES:

Okay. You stated you wanted to talk to us, what part do you
and what part don't you want to talk to us about?

RE:

Edgar do you remember me reading you're rights earlier and you
signing a waiver for us to search your home?

ET:

Ya.

RE:

Okay, we were called to your home on a gunshot.
there and seen some people. Who shot them?

ET:

Me.

RE:

You did?

ET:

Ya.

RE:

Why did you shoot them?

ET:

I shot Suzie cause I love her and I shot the other two.

RE:

Why did you shoot Chuck for?

ET:

Just to cover up the murder.

RE:

Okay, how did Debra get, come into the picture?

Edgar?

What don't

We got in
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ET:

I was going to shoot her too but she was pregnant.

RE:

Okay, why?

ET:

I shot Suzie cause I love her, I love her so much.

RE:

Was she going to leave you?

ET:

No.

RE:

If you loved her that much, there's a reason why you shot her.
Could you please explain why you shot her?

ET

I don't know.

RE

Okay.

ET

I don't know.

RE

Was it daylight?

ET

I don't know.

RE

How long have you been sniffing that solvent?

ET

Since 1962.

RE

Tonight how long?

ET

All day.

RE

Do you know what today's date is?

ET

You told me but I don't remember.

RE

Do you know what day of the week it is?

ET

No.

RE

What was yesterday?

ET

I don't have any idea.

ES

Do you work Edgar?

ET

No, I'm on SSI.

Why did you shoot them?

She wouldn't.

What time did you shoot them?

Or today?
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FTr

Sc-ial .''•-.-cur itv Supplemental Income,

RK:

What did you shoot Suzie with?

kh,:

W h a t did

:'. :

R'

you shoe t M a r t i n

tr.

Scotty.

-,u^t w a s s l e e p i n g
.

I

R]

-'kay, w h a t d i d ^ :

F*

E'l

RF,

.

^

floor?
.

• < . .

shoot h i r v ith?

v o u s h o o t Chuck, "w . i i?
"18.

*

..-.

• • --<=>

^

7

• •

I! II

REi

on t h e

" "• ' *• .tnow.

i i
Erl"

with?

And where else?
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ET:

I didn't see where the other place was.

RE:

Was he trying to get out of the bed?

ET:

Ya.

ES:

Who did you shoot first?

ET:

Suzie.

RE:

Then what happened?

ET:

Ya.

RE:

So they were all asleep?

ET:

Ya.

RE:

They were both awake talking to you?

ET:

Ya.

RE:

Where were the guns at when you decided to shoot them?

ET:

My hands.

RE:

Where were the guns at before you picked up the guns?
did you go get the guns from?

ET:

I picked, got them out of my room.

RE:

Is yours the bedroom way in the back?

ET:

Ya.

RE:

Okay.

ET:

Ya.

RE:

Was Chuck asleep?

ET:

I think so.

RE:

Okay. When you got the guns, where were, were they already
loaded or did you have to load them?

Did Scott wake up?

No they was both awake.

Where

You took them out of that bedroom?
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ET:

They were already loaded.

•

•

RE;

Do yju always carry loaded guns in your home?

E
RE:

What kind of car do you own?

ET:

199? f-10.

. ~.

L^V- . ^

LT

vnn Vnnw x,

license platp number is?

ti. 2221CN, 1 rr .::> .

L'l .

••*

wiii,c November ti :-•* .

RE:

Whopp i - tho hrm,^ vf H w i.

t he driveway?
^r.

RE:

Okay, wnos

pm,

,<s^ <~v^ ,-^ww

¥:2:

H o w l c m : h a v e you and Liuzic- b e e n together?

She* ' L

u

even appreci •

. : ros t i tu t P. .

bet.sions

-.*wv-u ^ o _ j "
ycu ' o .* j

that's why she has to stupid work.
,, Edgar ?
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ET:

No, I don f t do, I used to do it. I done it with her for about
two or three, I mean two or three days and it didn ! t even
effect me or anything.
I know I didn't, couldn't even get
off, just got back to toluene.

RE:

So why did you have to shoot Suzie?

ET;

I don't know, I don't know.

ES:

Does Suzie usually sleep in the bedroom with you or does she
sleep on the couch?

ET:

No, no, she just moved in.

RE:

How long have you known Suzie?

ET:

About 10 years.

RE:

And how long has she moved in with you?

ET:

She moved in about, she lived out there in Rose Park for about
two or three months after my mom died and she got an apartment
of her own and then.

RE:

How old are you Edgar?

ET:

45.

RE:

How long have you been on Social Security?

ET:

Since November of 88.

RE:

Where did you work at before you went on Social Security?

ET:

I don't remember.

RE;

Do you have any physical impairments?

ET:

I had a stroke. I couldn't get out of my room for three days.
I couldn't talk for seven. I was in the hospital for two and
a half months.

RE:

You said you had a stroke?

ET:

Ya.

She's...

Any physical injuries?
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FK

ll< »w

ETi

1 - »i | in "in i '
"

• inaudible. .. it was 1980, I mean 1931 , November of 1988,
The papers are, ,i n the trailer.

RE:

Okay,

Is there any mental problems?

ETi

Ya. A 1 ] Jk

RE:
ET:

What k..^ v^ tuer^al pr^M^r~°
See.
h^i- . -, \Ao]j *l: r er . Adolf Hitler died In May of
" *b a:v: * , ; i-*rr ;n i October 1946, I th i nk I'm Adolf

ES:
ETi

.

"

is ru.-'io y-;.ur girlfriend?
V

^

'

-^--i her more than di rth i ng e] se i i I t:l in i s ; i : i: 3 ::i

]

/e you?
• :>n f t know, I , I d o n ' t think so.

ET:

I ic>. _
did.

ES:

Well you've know her off and on for ten. years a n d . . .

!

i "

I don't think she

in i "ii .

ES:

I s s h e l i v i n g I n y o u r mom's h o u s e I i I Rose P a r k ?

FT:

Ya .
I i : n :i ] :i = c t \ • :: i: u : m : m' s 1 IC i is6 :i i l Rose I 'ark ?

ET:

i a.

C'j.

TAJhp^

.
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^/'
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^

*
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•

V >!

'
<•

)
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RE:

Why did they move out to you?

ET:

Cause they got kicked out of their apartments.

RE:

Why?

ET:

They, I don't know why, they just did, I don't know.

RE:

Who's Chuck?

ET:

She's Debbie's boyfriend. That's....

RE:

When did he get in town?

ET:

I think he came in a couple of three days ago.

RE:

Where's Debbie living?

ET:

With Suzie.

RE;

So she was staying in that house too?

ET:

Ya.

RE:

Trailer?

ET;

Ya.

RE;

So Chuck got here and he was staying in that back bedroom too?

ET:

I guess, I don't know.

RE:

When you shot him, is that the bedroom he was....

ET:

Ya.

RE:

And you did shoot him?

ET:

Ya.

ES:

Why did you shoot him?

ET:

I don't know.

RE:

I want you to think about this, Edgar.
with the .22.

I don't know. Just....
You shot Suzie first
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ET:

Ya.

r?T7

Then yon ''ln'l n<'ot' t. "I,j .,

FE:

Yoa went In the b e d r o o m to shoot chuck?

RE:

TeLl m e , describe whcit happened as you. ah, did you turn cr: th]:7ht?

ET:

No.

RE;

Coi il d y :: i i see 1 :i :i ;r i p r e t: t::;;:r g\ : i xi I

ET:

I couldi i't, I c o u l d n ' t , I, I w a s , I just, I couldn't even see
I couldn't see h I m I j"i is t: actua] 3 y I -~* '^r'*- -v.-- -.-. - .•
of them.

ET:

I'm jus t a lucky s h o t .

RE;

W e l l you said y c ; -he1",f i;
: *
.
knew yen shot- hi
*
fl.roat if *-ou c;uldn f t see

FT i

'

Ii:

11 ni y o u ever turn I. lie 1 i gl it back off?

ET:

.- I turned .
w n u t.

RE:

How many times did y o u shoot Chuck?

I "I

I

Kb.:

Why did y o u shoot him, t h e second time?

FT

I ]ust popped off t w o r o u n d s .

h1

liil

E'

"18.

a

•

£ t e r w a r ( 3 S j fu r n e c j or i tl i< :: 3 :i :jl i t:.

yon

have

a

ff

abcui six or seven twines, m a y b e m o r e than

hi rnr »

1*7?
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ES:

How many times did you shoot Scotty?

ET:

I don't know, about four I guess I don't know, at least he
claims.

RE:

Who claims?

ET:

Scotty.

RE:

When did you talk to Scotty?

ET:

He was still alive.

RE;

He was still alive?

ET;

Ya.

RE:

Why didn't you shoot him again?

ET:

I just couldn't handle it.

RE:

After you shot everybody, was the lights on in the trailer?

ET:

No, they was all off.
bedroom light was on.

RE:

That was your bedroom?

ET:

Ya, no the one this one.

RE:

The one Chuck was in?

ET:

No, the one in the hall.

RE;

Oh, the hall light?

ET:

Ya.

ES:

Okay, Edgar what we'd like to do is kind of start back in the
evening and tell us what happened. What time did they move
into your house.

ET:

I don't remember?

ES:

Yesterday?

One, the one light, the one back
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ET;

1 t h i nk

so.

ES:

E :» y oil 11 ::i i : • i v

ET:

I < i o n 1 t h a v e any

RE i

Was , i 1

ET;

I don1 t < •

RE:

W a s everybody doing
s n i f f i ng wit: h y c u'?

ET:

N o , Suzit- a n d thorn >-ind D e b b i e w e r e using h e r o i n a n d a h S c o t t y
w a s s t r a i g h t a n d , a n d a h , Chi ick w a s d r u n k . 1 doi i't ki low i £ he

'. I lie week

i I. w.j ,'

idea.

r .* \

heroin

in the hcuso

v^

..~~

~2

j .w

w a s i n t o r i c a t e d r *- vu -• ^
But he'd been drinking. 1

RE:
ET:
RE:

Everybody

*-*;;.:

ET:

1 just

IE . E ; '

Wh- J i: c s - I :

lc

'here

ET:

•.

RE;

* '• by yourself?

,,
arid

d i d y o u do ?

thought,

bedroom.

ET ;
RE;

What did you think about?
on * i Know wha t:
-v^ <-•"-—.——
*n^n you w a s in the bacK Uviroun, La^,^. , w:i th t h e gun w h y did
hnvp to ao out and shont i-h^m?

ET:

* uuf ,

'<-<' *

'i H v —

av- any idea.
- *•* a *- a n y v o i c e s ?
I

1 : i „' t ] ::i I : " i

. •

TAPED INTERVIEW
EDGAR TIEDEMANN
NOVEMBER 2, 1991
91-20773
PAGE 14
RE:

Who was telling you to go shoot them?

ET:

The devil.

RE;

Are you a christian man?

ET:

Ya.

RE:

Do you go to church?

ET:

Ya, I got to. . .inaudible. . .don't go to church, but I became an
L.D.S. person. I smoke and drink.

RE

You was sitting in your bcick bedroom, where was Debbie at?

ET

She was in the second bedroom.

RE

With Chuck?

ET

Ya.

RE

You walked down the hall?

ET

Ah-huh.

RE

Was the TV on?

ET

No.

RE

Radio on?

ET

No.

RE

What happened?

ET

No.

RE

Okay, you walked in....

ET

... inaudible...was dim.

RE

Okay, you walked down....

ET

Ya.

RE

...your's standing over Suzie, what happened?

Was the lights on?

I had the one light on in the hallway.
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c .
just

-' , * •-ippened.

t • the sheet

ever her h# id"

I can't, iigur*.
^r blanket over h e r head?

„ yo\: — e h e r face''

r.'I :

Ya

I c:
v

:
-:!

<* • ~ 'ouldn'r. tel] if h e r eyes w e r e c pe
- • T~rv:r:G al-ou* something, T >'~M ''

KM.

W h o w a s s;ie t a i K i r j tc?

RE:

Was she pleading for her life?

ETi

No.

ETi

No.

• •

RE:

She didn't see the gun at all?

ET:

No.

RE:

What d: - ^ ::u say to her before yoi i shot her ?

ET:
RE;

Yvnac •«

ET:

Noth:r *

> -^ s a y a f t e r you s h o t h e r ?

RE. :
ET:

No.

j^ E:

After y o u shot her

wh.it

11111 Sent t y Hi- 1
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ET:

He got up and flipped, flipped over the covers and then I shot
him.

RE:

Where did you shoot him at?

ET:

I don't know, in the stomach or, I mean in the arms and stuff
like that,
I donft know, I couldn't see very good
...inaudible... I just pumped about, I think I pumped two .22
shells into him and two .38 shells into him.

RE:

What side of the mattress was you standing when you shot him?
The kitchen side or the bedroom side of the mattress?

ET:

Bedroom side.

RE;

So how far away from you, how far away was Suzie when you shot
her?

ET:

Ah, there's a coffee table on the end so, I guess from the
coffee table to there.

RE

Did you aim?

ET

No, I only pulled the trigger.

RE

Just one time?

ET

Ya.

RE

And it was a lucky shot?

ET

Ya.

RE

I don't believe you.

ET

I don't know, I was just...

ES

Were you angry with Suzie?

ET

Ya.

ES

What were you angry at her for?

ET

Cause she ripped me off of six or seven thousand dollars.

RE

How did she rip you off?
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/ get her husband sent to prison and she bought coke, I ;:..leroin with a thousand dollars and then I qot her out of jaii
one time and she wasn't even in \ • i 1 and that was thr^"*
hundred dollars, she got this ticket, Lee vnat's his na::ie. ,
- i d and Debbie Lee and they split it. up and cl ;-t it up in
.<*:uin atd then ah, I got her, I get her an abortion and
round Cw": sh^'d been fixed, I knew she'd been fixed but x
mean, she didn't apprec:.itt? anyth:r.c;.
iew dii

UXIJL^,

way uiu you iei iifi move

JLJI

witli you?

•.'• T-t r ^ T . r

z*
* ' : *
ever a->k lie- * ;

o ri{-f*.«j j M
back?

wante-j to marry ner.

. fi ct t.-at mcney, .* : d j

She kept promising ^e she was g-in; t

RE

"Was you having a sexual relationship with her?

ET

1 a. '

RE

I low m a n y ,

ET

Ya.

rr

iii i\] i n i n 11111

ET:

I d o i I t ki low.

RE:

"Who w a s h e r

ET

I

RE:

Lee

ET:

Ya.

I .1 i I .]
Ward?

y n n c, s >

iI

in

^

i

11 i m i in

pimp?
i:

w a s

I .I"!- w.i i 11.

a

prostitu^.

*• i i P I i • ; ?
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ET:

A Niger.

RE:

Where does he live?

ET:

I don't know his exact address, somewhere in 13th South,
between 13th South and 7th West or something like that.

RE

Have you ever met him?

ET

Ya.

RE

Did he know that she was living with you?

ET

I think so.

RE

What's your phone number in your house?

ET

It was, ah, 263-8853, but I had it disconnected.

RE

Why?

ET

Cause I didn't trust them people.

ES

What people?

ET

Chuck and them other peoples and stuff.

ES

When did you have it disconnected?

ET

Huh?

ES

When did you have it disconnected?

ET

The day they move in.

RE

Yesterday?

ET

Ya.

RE

How far away were you from Scott when you shot Scott?

ET

I was standing in the same place where I shot Suzie.

RE

Then you walked down the hall?

ET

Ya.
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RE:

Tell me?

ET:

I walked down the hall and I shot four rounds.

RE:

Was you shooting your right hand or left hand?

ET:

I had them in both hands. I had my .22 in my left hand and my
.38 in my left, my right hand.

RE:

Are you right handed or left handed?

ET:

Right handed.

ES:

You had your .22 in the left hand and your .38 in the right?

ET:

Ya.

RE:

After you shot him

ET:

I felt terrible.

RE:

...what did you do then?

ET:

I felt terrible.

RE:

I understand that, but what did you do then?
Chuck what did you do?

ET:

I'm not sure. I laid down, I don't know what happened then.
It was all a blur.

RE:

What did you say to Debbie?

ET:

I talked to her for about two or three hours.

RE:

Where at?

ET:

I don f t know.

ES:

You say Scotty was still alive?

ET:

Ya.

ES:

What was Scotty doing?

ET:

Laying there moaning.

After you shot

I talked to her for several, I don't know.
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ES:

How long?

ET:

All day,

RE:

Did Suzie have AIDS?

ET:

I don't think so, I don't know, I don't know. I mean I could,
I think I got it, I don't know if I got it or what, I don't,
that's not important.

RE:

What's that?

ET:

That's not important.

RE:

Okay.

ET:

Went to get some heroin.

RE:

For who?

ET:

Debbie.

RE:

Why her?

ET:

I don't know, I wanted to get some cocaine.

ES:

For who?

ET:

I don't know, from Tony or something like that, I don't know
their names ..inaudible...

ES:

Was that for you or for him?

ET:

I wanted the heroin for Debbie and the cocaine for me.

RE:

How much money did you have on you?

ET:

I didn't have any money.

ES:

Who had money then?

ET:

Debbie.

RE:

Did Debbie know you was going to kill these people?

ET:

No.

Where did you go after you left your house?

For you or for Debbie?
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RE:

How long did you ride around with Debbie?

ET:

Well, I'd say about an hour or two, I don't know how long.

ES:

... inaudible...drugs?

ET:

No. I found a piece in Suzie's coat pocket, here, a piece of
heroin.

RE:

Is that Suzie's jacket?

ET:

Ya.

ES:

Whose idea was it to go get drugs?

ET:

Debbie's?

RE:

Why didn't you shoot Debbie there?

ET:

I couldn't fucking handle it, I came to my senses.
know why....

ES:

If you came to your senses, how come you didn't call somebody
to help Scotty?

ET:

I don't know.

ES:

How old is Scotty?

ET:

I think he's 15.

ES:

How old's Suzie?

ET:

I think she's 33.

RE:

How old's Debbie?

ET:

I think she's 37.

ES:

Anything happy between you and Debbie?

ET:

Ya.

ES:

What happened?

I don't

I don't know if I came to my senses or not.

I think Chuck's 44.
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ET:

Um, Debbie and Suzie would take turn sitting on my face and
fucking me,

ES:

When?

ET:

Oh, a couple of times or I don't know.

RE:

Last night?

ET:

Ah, I don't know.

RE:

Did you have ah, have sex with Debbie today?

ET:

Ya.

RE:

Where at?

ET:

The front room, I mean on the hall.

RE:

After you shot them?

ET:

Ya.

RE:

After you shot Suzie, Scott and Chuck, you took Debbie in the
hallway and did she submit to you or did you rape her?

ET:

She submitted to me.

RE:

What, how did it happen?

ET:

Well I had her wash her pussy out real good and I ate her out
and then I fucked her.

ES:

Did she say anything to you?

RE:

Did she want it?

ET:

Ya, I think so.

RE:

What did she say?

ET:

She said it was real enjoyable.

RE:

When did she tell you that?

ET:

Just after we did it.

What did you say to her?
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ES:

Did you have your guns with you still?

ET:

I laid them down on the floor.

ES:

Did you have your guns with you when you made her clean
herself?

ET:

Ya.

ES:

Where was sure when you told her to get up and clean herself?

ET:

What's this?

ES:

How did this come about? You Scott, you shot Chuck, how did
you come to talk with Debbie? What did she do?

ET:

What do you mean, what did she do.

ES:

After you shot Chuck, what did she do?
him, is that correct?

ET:

Ya.

ES:

So what does she do?

ET:

Not much, she came up and we talked for a while.

RE:

What did you talk about?

ET:

How much I loved Suzie.

RE:

Did she know that you just shot Suzie and Scott?

ET:

Ya.

RE:

Was she crying?

ET:

No. She had a horrified look on her face.
from the heroin.

RE:

After you brought her out of the bedroom, you talked for a
while in the hallway?

ET:

No, she sat down on the couch and we talked for about two or
three hours.

She was in bed with

I think it's just
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ES:

On the couch next to Suzie?

ET:

No on the other couch.

ES:

What was Scott doing all this time?

ET:

Moaning.

ES:

So you talked for two or three hours and you had her get up
and go to the bathroom?

ET:

Ya.

ES:

Did you go into the bathroom with her?

ET:

No, I just stood out in the hall.

ES:

Then what happened?
her?

ET:

Ya.

RE:

What was she wearing?

ET:

Ah, a yell, I mean a white terry cloth towel, or a terry cloth
robe or whatever it is.

RE:

Any panties?

ET:

No.

RE:

Bra?

ET:

No.

ES:

Was she wearing any clothes when she was in bed with Chuck?

ET:

No.

RE:

Why didn't you go back in your bedroom? Edgar? Why didn't
you take Debbie back into her bedroom?
Back into your
bedroom?

ET:

I don't know, I just, I didn't think Suzie was dead.

RE:

Okay.

I left the door open.

Is that when you performed oral sex on

Suzie was sleeping on the couch.
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ET:

Ya.

RE:

Scott's sleeping on the floor.
in your bedroom with you?

ET:

She wouldn't do it.

RE:

She'd make love to you but she wouldn't sleep with you?

ET:

No.

ES:

Did you have intercourse with her that night?

ET:

No.

ES:

When was the last time you had intercourse with Suzie?

ET:

Two or three days ago. Me and, me and Debbie and Suzie did,
I ate Suzie's pussy and Debbie was sitting on my dick.

RE:

Do you always have a threesome?

ET:

Ya. Well most, a lot of times just Suzie.
the best.

RE:

Why?

ET:

Cause I love her.

ES:

Do you tell her that?

ET:

Every fucking day and night.

ES:

What does she say?

ET:

She didn't seem to say nothing?

ES:

Did she laugh at you?

ET:

I don't know what she did.

ES:

Did she laugh at you?

ET:

No, I don't think she, I don't know if she did or what.

just....

How come Suzie's not sleeping

I like just Suzie

She just....

She
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RE:

What did she say tonight or today that made you angry enough
to shoot her?

ET:

I don't know.

RE:

What did she do to make you angered, that angered you?

ET:

I don't know, I have no idea, just

ES:

What made you have sexual relations with her sister after you
shot her?

ET:

I don't know what that was. I guess I was just horny, I don't
know.

RE:

Shooting those people get you excited?

ET:

No.

RE:

Did you have an erection after you shot them?

ET:

No.

ES:

When did you get the erection?

ET:

When I was eating Suzie out, I mean Debbie out.

ES:

Did you ever have a sexual relationship prior to police
officer finding you?

ET:

Huh?

ES:

Did you have sex with her anymore prior to the police catching
you? After you left your trailer?

ET:

No.

ES:

Where did you go?

ET:

We went to score some dope.

RE:

Who was driving?

ET:

Debbie.

ES:

What vehicle?
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ET:

Chuck's truck, I mean Chuck's car.

RE:

What kind of car is it?

ET:

I don't know, it's an Oldsmobile I think or something like
that.

RE:

Is them the clothes you was wearing last night?

ET:

Ya.

RE:

And the same clothes you had on after you had sex with Debbie?

ET:

Ya.

ES:

What were you wearing when you shot Suzie?

ET:

These clothes here.

ES:

So you were fully dressed?

ET:

Ya, except for this jacket here. This jacket here we, I mean,
we picked it off, I mean it was on, all I had to do was, a
jacket, two jackets, I picked this one here.

RE:

Why did you pick that one?

ET:

She got the other one, Debbie got the other one.

RE:

Why didn't you grab your jacket?
I mean Suzie's.

ET:

... inaudible...

RE:

Okay.

ES:

Did you get any dope?

ET:

Ya.

ES:

Where all did you go?

ET:

I don't know.

ES:

How many places did you go?

Why did you grab Debbie's?

You said no right?

...inaudible...
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ET:

We just kept driving around and looking for the dope, I mean
calling places. I couldn't get the phone numbers.

ES:

What was Debbie saying?

ET:

Huh?

ES:

What was Debbie saying?

ET:

Saying?

ES:

What did she say? How did you guys decide to go ahead and go?
Whose idea was that?

ET

Hers.

ES

She asked you to call medical?

ET

No, no.

ES

She asked you to call for help?

ET

No.

ES

Was Scotty still sitting there, laying there moaning?

ET

Ya.

ES

Was he moaning when you left?

ET

I think so.

ES

Which door did you go out of?

ET

That door.

ES

Did you leave it unlocked or did you lock it?

ET

I locked it I think.

ES

How does it lock?

ET

Just push the button in.

RE

Was the front door already locked?
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ET:

Ya.

RE:

What did Debbie say to you while you was riding around?

ET:

Well she said that we could go back and get it on and....

RE:

And what else?

ET:

I donft know just.

RE:

Edgar?

ET:

Huh?

RE:

I think it's time you start telling us the truth.

ET:

That's the truth.

ES:

Edgar?

ET:

What.

ES:

We think it's time you start telling us the truth. The whole
truth. I think what you're saying is, is close, but I think
there's some other things that you know that you're just not
telling us.

RE:

I think you're fantasizing about a few things here and what
we'd like you to do is tell us exactly what happened.
Truthfully.

ET:

That's what happened.

RE:

Why did you shoot Suzie?

ET:

I loved her.

RE:

What happened that you got so angered that you went into the
back bedroom, got a gun, walked up to the foot of the couch,
pulled the weapon up to your eye, took aim and shot her in the
head?

ET:

I didn't shoot her, I mean, I pulled it down like that, I just
.. .

RE:

Show me again.
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ET:

Like that.

RE:

Stand up and show me, I can't....

ES:

Stand up. Okay, I'm on the couch.
the gun that you shot Suzie with?

ET:

This one here.

ES:

That's your left hand, you had the .22?

ET:

Ya.

ES:

How many times did you squeeze the trigger?

ET:

Once.

ES:

What could you see?

ET:

I wasn't sure.

RE:

Is the .22 an automatic or a revolver?

ET:

An automatic.

ES:

...inaudible....

ET:

Huh?

ES:

... inaudible...is that from the stroke?

ET:

Ya.

RE:

Edgar, why did you shoot Suzie.
If you loved her, you
wouldn't have shot her.
You've know her for ten years.
You've talked to her before, you've been able to talk problems
out before. What problem manifested itself tonight or today
or last night that gave you the impulse to kill her?

ET:

I don't know.

RE:

Something had to turn you, what turned you?

ES:

You say you were talking to her when you walked up and at the
bottom of the couch. What was she saying to you?

Which hand did you have
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ET:

She was telling me I was disgusting.

RE:

Why?

ET:

I don't know.

ES:

Now tell us.

RE:

I'm going to talk to Debbie and Debbie's going to tell us her
side of the story, so I want you to tell ya, tell us your side
before we talk to her.

ET:

That is my side of the story.

RE;

Did you get that sexually aroused by killing those people that
you....

ET:

No.

ES:

Then why after killing the woman you love, do you have
intercourse with her sister?

ET:

Cause I liked Debbie second.

RE:

Edgar, start telling the truth.
There's something that
snapped in that trailer house, last night or early this
morning that made you kill Suzie.

ET:

I don't know what happened.

RE:

It wasn't the devil. You didn't hear voices. What happened?

ET:

I don't know.

ES:

When she said that you were disgusting, when did she say that?

ET:

She said, she said I was disgusting.

ES:

What was happening before that? She sat on the couch and
yelled down the hall? Is that disgusting?

ET:

No, she was laying there.

RE:

She called you what?

ET:

Tiede.

I love all women.

She called me ...inaudible...
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ES:

Is that a nickname?

ET:

Ya.

ES:

What did she say?

ET:

She said you were disgusting.

ES:

What had you done?

ET;

Nothing.

ES:

Was this when you had the guns in your hand or before?

ET:

I had the guns in my hand.

ES:

Okay, something had to have happened as you walked down the
hall with two guns in your hand. Not one gun, two guns.
Something had to got happened for you to come from your
bedroom down the hall, two guns in your hand, point the gun at
Debbie, at Suzie and take a shot.

ET:

I don't know.

RE:

After you shot Suzie, did you do anything else to her?

ET:

No, I covered her up.

RE:

With the blanket?

ET:

Ya.

ES:

What was she wearing?

ET:

I donft know.

RE:

Did she have any blankets on her?

ET:

I think so, I don't know.

RE:

Or did you just cover her head up?

ET:

Her whole, her whole body.

RE:

So she was laying on the couch with any covers on her when you
shot her?
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ET:

No, she was, she had covers down to her, down around here.

RE:

Down to her waist?

ET:

Ya.

RE:

Did she have her bra on?

ET:

I don't know.

RE:

Did she have clothing that covered her?

ET:

Ya.

RE:

Did she sit up when you shot her?

ET:

No.

RE:

She was laying down?

ES:

Edgar, did you ask her to come in the hall before you shot
her?

ET:

No.

ES:

Had you asked her to come and sleep with you earlier?

ET:

Ya.

ES:

What did she say?

ET:

Just telling me I was disgusting.

ES:

How did this conversation begin. They're doing heroin, Debbie
and Suzie are doing heroin, where are they doing their heroin?

ET:

Ah, sometimes my bathroom other times....

ES:

Where were they doing it this time?

ET:

I think they was using the bathroom over there because I,
seven, seven fifteen, fourth north and 74 0 East, Apartment C.

ES:

They were doing heroin before they got to your house?

RE:

Who with?
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ET:

I don't know.

RE:

With him?

ET:

I don't know.

RE:

Is Debbie a prostitute, too?

ET:

I think so.

ES:

So you asked Suzie to sleep with you and she called you
disgusting?

ET

Ya, I guess so.

ES

Well no, is it true or not?

ET

I thinks it is.

ES

Okay, I'm just telling you what you told me.

ET

Ya.

RE

Edgar?

ET

Huh?

RE

Why did you shoot them?

ET

I don't know.

RE

Why did you shoot Scotty and Chuck then?

ET

I don't know.

RE

Have we made any threats to you during this interview?

ET

No.

RE

Have we promised you anything?

ET

No.

RE

Are you making this statement on your own free will?

ET

Ya.

I just, I don't know.
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RE:

Is there anything else that you can tell us in your defense?
Is there anything that you want to tell us to help us?

ET:

I don't want to make any appeals and I want to be put to death
by lethal injection.

RE:

You know you're going to be charged with a capital homicide?

ET:

I know.

RE:

Why did you do it?

ET:

I don't know.

RE:

Are you under any influence of any other drugs or alcohol?

ET:

Just toluene.

RE:

How do you feel?

ET:

Lousy.

RE:

Okay, do you understand everything I've said?

ET:

Sometimes.

RE:

You've made a response to everything I've asked you, is that
correct?

ET:

I think so.

RE:

Do you have anything else to say?

ET:

I'll think of something in a while.

RE:

Okay, we're going to conclude this interview, same date at
3:00 PM.

